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As with all countries around the world, the ageing of Japanese society is putting severe 
pressure on the public pension system. The Japanese system is complex with a basic 
pension for all citizens, but different forms of additional support for self employed, 
private sector and public sector employees.  The basic pension is covered through 
contributions and a subsidy by the government. This government contribution is derived 
from general taxation and is increasing over time as a percentage of the overall wage bill, 
but is a fundamental pillar of the concept of social solidarity. The public Social Security 
pension system for private sector workers has the highest coverage of the 3 working 
groups (30 million out of a total of 70 million) and has recently been converted to a 
“fixed premium” system, whereby contributions of employers and employees is being 
raised gradually but fixed thereafter. In other words, it appears that the system is being 
converted to ensure that additional taxes are not forced on the working population or 
companies as the population pyramid deteriorates, and to pass on some risk to pensioners 
by potentially lowering benefits and ensuring a “limited balanced system”. Some attempt 
has been made to prevent a major decline of benefits through certain options making the 
system largely defined benefit. Japan has a unique set of favorable circumstances. The 
surplus of contributions over pensions in the past has been accumulated in a Trust Fund. 
These monies were previously loaned to the government but a recent reform led to a 
transition of this fund to a market-based global portfolio with appropriate governance and 
oversight. We apply some insights from Modigliani and Muralidhar (2003) to the 
Japanese system and demonstrate that given the unique and far-thinking measures already 
undertaken by the Japanese, that the financing of pensions is robust. However, rather than 
gradually depleting the fund over the next 95 years, if a small improvement can be made 
to the target return of the fund, potentially contributions could be reduced, while also 
lowering the volatility of contributions. Modigliani and Muralidhar (2003) showed that 
keeping a system partially funded was beneficial relative to a pure pay-as-you-go system 
as it could lower the volatility of contributions and make countries more competitive (as 
contributions are a tax on companies and could lead to higher wages). Japan has a unique 
opportunity to manage the most dramatic ageing of a population globally through some 
innovative, minor modifications, especially since they area at a very advantageous 
situation currently relative to countries such as the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Public pension systems around the world are facing a severe crisis because of ageing 
populations and moderate forecasts for economic growth. One of the reasons for the crisis 
is that many pension systems adopted a Pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) scheme whereby the 
pensions of the retirees would be paid through taxes on the working population. Such a 
system is sustainable if population and productivity increases are adequate, but over the 
last few decades not only has population growth and estimates for economic growth been 
scaled back, but also improvements in medical sciences has extended the life expectancy 
of retirees post-retirement and the population growth rate is very low. Japan is facing 
such a crisis as the population is ageing dramatically with the ratio of population aged 64 
and higher to total population is expected to rise from 17.4% in 2000 to 28.7% in 2025 
and increase thereafter. As a result, the number of workers to support a retiree will drop 
from 3.6 in 2000 to 1.5 fairly rapidly. 
 
In any pension system, the pensions of the retirees can be financed through three basic 
approaches: pay-as-you-go, full funding or a combination of the two (partial funding). 
The simplistic Chart 1 from Muralidhar (2001)
2 shows that the pensions can be paid 
either through contributions (pure pay-as-you-go) or contributions plus the return on 
current and future assets (a funded mechanism). 
                                                 
2 Innovations in Pension Fund Management (2001), by Arun S. Muralidhar, Stanford University Press, CA, 
















Why did so many countries opt for PAYGO? The simple reason is that in a fully funded 
system, the pension is paid out of the accumulated capital stock of each retiree's account. 
Therefore, only those who have contributed for their entire working life will receive a full 
pension. Participants, who are close to retirement and did not contribute to the pension 
system, receive nothing. Under PAYGO, however, current workers’ contributions are 
used to pay full pensions to all workers from day one, as if the retirees had contributed in 
full throughout their working life. For this reason, when a universal mandatory pension 
system is begun, PAYGO provides the most appealing solution. The decision to use 
PAYGO is, in effect, a transfer to pensioners who, without having contributed, receive a 
pension at the expense of future generations, who lose the capital accumulation of a 
funded system. 
 
As many countries aged, the contributions required to sustain the PAYGO system 
become unbearable and many countries opted for reform.  Chile was one of the first countries to reform its pension system in 1981, by moving away from PAYGO to a total 
or partial return to some form of a funded system.  This shift was based, primarily, on the 
premise that investing accumulated assets in income yielding assets would provide a 
significantly higher return than the implicit return offered by PAYGO, which is the long 
run growth rate of wages. 
 
This transition was effected by requiring individuals to redirect their contributions to 
individual accounts, invested in financial assets. The system would eventually eliminate 
the role of Social Security and the public sector, and for that reason has come to be 
known as the "privatization of Social Security.”  This approach soon became the standard 
that was replicated in numerous other developing countries, often at the urging/coercion 
of agencies such as the World Bank. A number of academicians and politicians in 
developed countries, such as the United States, favor this approach. The Chilean model, 
however, suffers from very serious flaws, that can be corrected by better design. In fact, 
even the Chilean have recognized the flaws of their system and announced in 2006 that 
they would reform the reform and the state would start to play a much larger role than in 
the past because the expectations for benefits under defined contribution were too low, 
and the profitability of asset management companies was too high – close to a return of 
50% on assets annually (effectively another reason why benefits are low as high 
costs/lower net return imply lower benefits).
3 In addition, some thought is being given to 
bundling participants or even getting a state administrator involved to help reduce 
commissions.  
                                                 
3 “Chile Proposed to Reform Pension System – Partial Retreat from Privatization Would Increase Benefits” 
New York Times, December 26, 2006, page A18.  
Countries such as Australia and Hungary have opted for systems whereby collective 
arrangements attempt to mitigate the problems in individual account models. In addition, 
a number of countries are in a position to make the transition from systems on the verge 
of bankruptcy to a more robust system that protects retirees from (i) retiring poor, (ii) 
bearing unnecessary risk, or (iii) being forced to make decisions on investment matters in 
which they have little or no expertise. 
 
Japan is in a unique position compared to other countries such as the United States or 
some European countries and has adopted a reform to preserve defined benefits. In this 
paper, we will first review the conclusions and analytic approach of Modigliani and 
Muralidhar (2003), hereafter MM.
4 We will then provide a quick summary of our 
understanding of the Japanese system. Thereafter, we will demonstrate that with very 
moderate changes, Japan has a unique ability to achieve the objectives and pension 
system outlined in MM. While we are not experts on the Japanese system and have spent 
a very short time understanding all the nuances of the system, the idea here is to provide 
some alternative scenarios to an already robust system to ensure that Japanese Social 
Security can guarantee retirees a safe retirement without risk of falling into poverty while 
at the same time allowing for Japanese labor to be competitive by potentially lowering 
the level and volatility of the Social Security tax.
 
                                                 
4 Rethinking Pension Reform (2004), by Prof. Franco Modigliani and Dr. Arun Muralidhar, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. SECTION 2: THE MODIGLIANI- MURALIDHAR APPROACH TO PENSION 
REFORM 
 
MM made a few key points that were different from the conventional Anglo-Saxon 
wisdom on pension reform and social security systems and hence the title of their book, 
“Rethinking Pension Reform”. Critically, they highlighted that two distinct issues to be 
considered, with respect to any proposed reform are: (a) what the system should look like 
for the future and (b) how one should achieve that system if it is different from the 
current model,  given the current economic and political realities (the transition problem). 
Many analysts had confused the two and while it may be desirable to have an effective 
system, in many cases, initial conditions and social, economic and political realities may 
limit the degree of transition to a new system.  
 
Their key conclusions of the reforms they analyzed in the US, Spain (subsequently 
Luxembourg
5) and emerging markets, but applied more generally to any country 
reviewing the pension system are summarized below: 
•  The crisis in Social Security was only a funding crisis of focusing pension 
systems largely on PAYGO 
•  There was no need to convert systems to defined contribution (DC) schemes and 
that the so-called “privatization” of Social Security only privatized risk. DC 
schemes would lead to wide spread old age poverty because individuals were not 
skilled in investment issues, administrative costs are high and the cost to 
                                                 
5 See Muriel Bouchet’s proposal for Luxembourg in Reforming European Pension Systems (forthcoming in 
2007), eds. Drs. Serge Allegarazza  and Arun Muralidhar, Luxembourg Institute for European and 
International Studies, Luxembourg. governments of averting old age poverty would be much higher than under DB 
schemes.  
•  Basing a system on the principle of PAYGO is not optimal as such a system over 
the long term (or in steady state) leads to higher and, more important, a greater 
volatility of contributions versus an equivalent funded system
6. As shown in 
Appendix 1, for small changes in parameters underlying a PAYGO system, the 
change in contributions could be quite large compared to a funded system. This 
analysis is generic and could be easily applied to assumptions of key parameters 
for Japan. 
•  It is not possible to transition immediately from PAYGO to funding as funding 
dominates only because assets have been accumulated in the past. MM shows that 
given relatively generous pension benefits in many countries, assets under the 
control of a public pension system under a “fully funded” system would exceed 
reasonable thresholds and hence they suggest a transition to a partially funded 
system and demonstrate an analytical approach to establishing a stable and 
solvent pension system. 
•  They suggested a simpler concept for the statement of benefits under a DB 
scheme: namely, guarantee a return on contributions (as a guaranteed return on 
contributions was the effective equivalent of a traditional DB scheme) and solve 
the problem of complex pension formulae with weak links to contributions. 
                                                 
6 Most researchers focus only on the level of the contribution and not its volatility. Hence, very often they 
claim that there is no Pareto improvement from moving from a PAYG system to a funded system. However, 
when volatility of contributions is considered, one can make a strong case for Pareto improvement from a 
transition to a more funded or mixed system. •  To manage the political risk of assets being managed by the public sector and 
being scrutinized every time the stock market dipped, they suggest the creation of 
a swap contract that guarantees the Social Security agency a fixed rate of return in 
exchange for the return of a portfolio of assets invested based on market 
capitalization weights. These assets would be under the supervision of a Blue 
Ribbon Board and hence managed with optimal governance. Canada and Ireland 
were cited as examples of countries where such Boards have managed assets 
effectively. 
•  Additionally, they demonstrate that a partially funded system with variable 
contributions may ensure the most effective system from the point of view of 
lowering the level and volatility of contributions for a given defied benefit.  
 
MM provides a very simple equation to explain how one can examine the dynamics of a 
pension system regardless of how it is financed. Define At to be the asset to wage ratio at 
time t (and this could be zero in a pure PAYGO system), ct to be the contribution rate at 
time t (i.e., contributions divided by wages), ρ to be the rate of growth of real income, 
made up of two components (the growth of the labor force, n, and productivity growth, q), 
r to be the gross real rate of return on financial assets and pt to be the pensions-to-wages 
ratio also called the cost ratio. When the pension system reaches a steady state, the 
following fundamental relationship must hold:  
pt = ct + At-1(r-ρ)………………………….(1) 
We will call this equation the “Golden SS Rule” and the derivation is provided in 
Appendix 1. The net return on the system’s reserves, combined with the contributions must cover the benefits. If this is not the case, A will be rising or declining or c will need 
to be altered and the pension fund is not in steady state. 
 
In the case of the United States and Spain
7, MM demonstrates that without immediate 
reform and a greater move towards partial funding, contributions can rise quite 
dramatically. This is because the cost ratio of the defined benefit system is also gradually 
rising to a relatively stable level of 19% of US wages by 2070 (from a current level 
below12%).  Therefore, in the United States, combined contributions of employers and 
employees would rise from 12.4% of wages to approximately 19% - an increase of 50%. 
This is inspite of the fact that the United States has accumulated some assets in a Trust 
Fund (equivalent to approximately 30% of wages currently), but the ageing of the 
population will lead to a depletion of the assets in approximately 40 years causing a jump 
in contributions. However, since the problem is not immediate and such a transition 
occurs many years in the future, it is easy for politicians to delay reform and pass on the 
big shock to future generation. Unfortunately, the cost of reform keeps increasing every 
day the reform is delayed. MM demonstrates that if surpluses from the Clinton 
Administration been used to increase the funding of the U.S. system in 2000, combined 
with a sensible investment policy that is based on sound financial principles and with 
effective governance, that contributions could actually have been lowered rather being 
raised in the future. Since the Bush Administration spent this surplus through a reduction 
in personal taxes, the only way to ensure permanent solvency in the United States is to 
raise contributions permanently by 1.1% and implement an effective investment policy 
on the assets immediately. Such a reform would ensure that contributions for all future 
                                                 
7 See also application to Luxembourg by Muriel Bouchet in Allegeraza and Muralidhar (2007). generations can be stabilized at 13.5% as opposed to rising closer to 19%. The balance of 
5.5% of the pension over the contribution is financed through the returns on assets, which 
in the MM equilibrium is a net return on assets (net of inflation, productivity growth and 
population growth) of 5.2% earned on a portfolio that is approximately 1.5 times wages. 
 
The Japanese case appears to be very similar to the case of the United States with minor 
variations and with substantially better conditions for Japan. The system is a defined 
benefit system with provision for old-age, disability and survivor pensions. Contributions 
are shared equally by employer and employee
8, benefits have some element of 
price/wage indexation, the target replacement rate is approximately 50% of average 
wages
9, a trust fund exists and the cost ratio appears to be rising from a current level of 
22% to a steady state level of 29% by 2050. The Japanese investment policy is far more 
enlightened than the current US Social Security system as the funds have been invested in 
stocks, bonds in domestic and foreign markets, whereas the US Social Security Trust 
Fund is effectively lent to the US government for non-marketable securities. In this paper, 
we will attempt to apply the MM approach to reforming the Japanese public pension 
system. We will first review key aspects of the Japanese system and then see if the 
simulations applied in MM to the US and Spanish (and even Luxembourg) case provide 
any interesting results for Japan. Given the favorable initial conditions in Japan, it can be 
shown that small changes to the system can have long term beneficial impact to the 
country, but because they involve decisions on investments and contributions that can 
have political implications, we try to address these issues as well. 
                                                 
8 Though MM argues that this really does not matter. It is who bears the tax that is more relevant than who 
pays the tax and in all likelihood, on average, the employee is bearing the entire tax. 




The pension system in Japan is very complex with many layers of pensions offered both 
from government, employers and industries for self-employed workers. There is a 
periodic review every 5 years to ensure solvency of the system for the following 95 years 
and hence the reform process is dynamic and not static. The system, as of the last reform, 
can be summarized very briefly as follows: 
•  A basic pension is provided to 70 million participants and this basic pension is 
financed through general revenues (or a government subsidy) and individual 
contributions. The contributions to this scheme are set in Yen terms (as opposed 
to a percentage of salary) so all participants pay the same burden. 
•  Additionally, there is a supplementary pension that varies based on type of 
employment 
o  Self employed workers (approximately 20 million participants) have 
access to a defined contribution scheme 
o  Private sector workers (approximately 32 million participants) are covered 
under the Employees’ Pension Insurance Scheme (EPI) and this is a 
contributory scheme based on total compensation which includes salary 
plus bonus. 
                                                 
10 This summary is based on data gathered from Ministry of Health Labor and  
Welfare website http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/org/policy/p36-37a.html and various 
conversations with leading experts in Japan on these topics. All errors of interpretation 
are mine. 
 o  Public sector workers (approximately 4.7 million participants) are covered 
under a Mutual Aid Pension. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we will focus solely on the EPI system as being the critical 
pillar of the Japanese Social Security system as it impacts the private sector and 
implicitly the competitiveness of the economy. This is an unusual plan as the system was 
originally defined benefits with the current replacement rate closer to 60% but with a 
gradual decline of the replacement rate to 50.2% of average salary by FY 2023. The 
reason for this transition was that a recent reform enacted many changes in the structure 
with a goal to ensuring financial stability of the fund through 2100. The changes are 
highlighted below: 
 
•  The system has been recently converted to a “fixed premium”/contribution system 
through a “step-wise premium raising method”. In other words, the contribution 
levied on employers and employees is being gradually raised from 14.288% in FY 
2005 to 18.3% in FY 2017, but then fixed thereafter. In short, the contribution is 
raised in steps of 0.354% until 18.30% is achieved. 
•  The government subsidy as a percentage of wages will continue to increase over 
time. 
•  By working towards a system where the rise in contributions of employees and 
employers is capped, the reform effectively transfers the volatility of various 
parameters to the benefits paid and thereby to the pensioner (or replacement rate 
of the pensioner) as opposed to allowing the premiums to increase over time. This appears to be a sensible move as: (a) with a rapidly aging population, supporting a 
replacement rate of 60% of average salary would lead to a dramatic increase in 
contributions; and (b) in many countries, including the United States, the target 
replacement rate for Social Security is approximately 50% of career average 
wages. 
•  Even with these changes, the cost ratio is increasing over time from 22% to 29% 
of wages as shown in Table 1, column 1 (and hence without any adjustments, 
contributions would have risen dramatically).  
•  In other words, benefits adjust over time based on “macro-economic adjustment” 
whereby the benefit is lowered because of the decrease in labor force and increase 
in life expectancy. Such adjustments are made to the Basic Pension. In addition, 
modifications have been made to the indexation of benefits to moderate the 
growth of pensions below the projected growth of wages (of 2.1%).  
•  However, many options have been included to prevent pensions from declining 
below a certain level and hence a strong element of the defined benefit is being 
preserved while allowing for benefits to adapt to changing economic realization. 
Therefore, if the inflation indexation rate would fall below 0% while wages rose, 
the true indexation is prevented from falling below 0%. However, if wage growth 
was negative, then the inflation indexation would match the rate of wage growth. 
•  A substantial pool of assets has been designated as a trust fund to ensure the 
solvency of the system and the newly created Pension Reserve Fund 
Administration and Investment Agency (PRFA) will be responsible for investing the assets.
11 The current asset size including marketable and non-marketable 
assets is already in excess of 100 Trillion Yen (approximately USD 1 trillion) and 
this is projected to grow over time as contributions are raised. The current Trust 
Fund is estimated to be in excess of 100% of wages as shown in Table 1. The 
structure and composition of these assets is discussed below. 
•  The objective of the system is to ensure “limited balance” by 2100, which means 
that the Trust Fund will be drawn down over time to meet the rising cost ratio 
while capping employer and employee contributions. By 2100, the Trust Fund 
will hold a balance of just one year’s benefit (as opposed to a current level of 
nearly 5 years’ coverage). However, with a rolling 5 year review plan, the actual 
coverage for the year 2100 will keep increasing as the rolling target of one year’s 
coverage will keep drifting 5 years out
12. 
•  Given an anticipated growth of nominal wages of 2.1%, projected inflation of 1%, 
it is estimated that a nominal return of 3.2% (or 1.1% above wage growth) will be 
adequate to achieve this objective of “limited balance”. This target return is used 
by PRFA to establish the appropriate asset allocation to achieve this result and the 
bias is to achieve through a diversified portfolio of largely index and passive 
investments (i.e., get the returns from beta as opposed to alpha). We will discuss 
investment issues later. 
•  In other words, the transition that will take place will move the EPI system from a 
partially funded system to a less partially funded system in 2100 and potentially 
                                                 
11 Formerly known as GPIF. 
12 I thank Sakamoto-san for this clarification. back to PAYGO beyond 2100. However, such long term projections are difficult 
to make and hence this degree of solvency gives comfort to the decision makers. 
 
In Japan, one must consider the modified Golden SS Rule as follows: 
 
pt = ct + st + At-1(r-ρ)………………………….(2) 
 
where st is the government subsidy at time t for the Basic pension. 
 
However, as column 4 of Table 1 demonstrates, the government contribution is non-
trivial and currently at 3% of wages and rising over time to 6% of wages. From an 
economic point of view, this is also a tax on competitiveness as ultimately government 
contributions are financed by higher taxes on individuals and this number can vary over 
time as projected currently. This should not come as a surprise as the cost ratio is 
increasing and as we demonstrate in equation 1 above, if p is rising to 26%-29% and if c 
is fixed at 18.3%, then without additional contributions or sales of assets, benefits cannot 
be paid. With s rising over time to only 6%, then the balance of the 5% between pensions 
and all inflows (or what we call the PRFA surplus) is being covered over time through 
sales of assets and hence A is declining.  
 
Therefore, at some point, A will approach zero and contributions will have to rise. As 
shown in column 9 of table 1, such an event will take place after 2100, which is just 
beyond the forecast period and hence such a system exports the crisis to the future generations. We can refer to such a date as the “BIG SHOCK” as the Social Security 
tsunami will hit the population and contributions will have to rise dramatically. One way 
to prevent such a BIG SHOCK has been to implement the rolling 5 year plans and 
thereby gradually push this point out 5 years at a time. 
 
One reason for such a dramatic change of the system is that wages are projected to grow 
at 2.1% in nominal terms, inflation is projected to grow at 1%, and the annualized 
nominal rate of return is projected to be just 3.2%, but the rate of growth of the labor 
force is expected to be negative! However, such a profile of declining funding is 
intentional as it is clear that the system is being converted to a more PAYGO system. 
One of the apparent reasons for such a move was to reduce the size of assets under 
government control as that was a major concern. 
 
However, the target rate of return is a choice variable and if one chose a higher return, the 
dynamics of the entire system could change. The target return from this investment 
portfolio is currently 3.2% and results in PRFA making a large strategic allocation to 
domestic bonds (target is expected to be 67% in government bonds). While we will 
discuss the potential impact of investing a large portion in government bonds at a time 
when interest rates will potentially rise, the more important issue is why is the portfolio 
invested so heavily in bonds? The explanation is provided in MHW literature which 
suggests that the assets of PRFA/GPIF must be invested “safely” meaning immune from 
market fluctuation. This is probably a result of experiencing losses on the equity portfolio 
when Japanese stocks performed poorly from 2000 – 2003. But the concept of “safe investment” when applied in reference to the purely investment portfolio implies a 
potentially lower rate of return than is achievable on the assets. Therefore, a safe portfolio 
which targets a lower return than is feasible in the markets can mean a more PAYGO 
system that, as we indicated earlier and demonstrated in Appendix 1, may keep 
contributions higher and more volatile than if the system was more funded!  
 
This is what we already see in the case of the pension system in Table 1 and will 
demonstrate the additional implications from such an investment policy. Moreover, as 
shown in MM, there are effective ways to raise the return of the GPIF/PRFA portfolio 
while ensuring that the Social Security system is safe. We will first provide some 
simulations about various possible impacts on the EPI system from changing the 
assumptions about target rate of return, additional contributions etc to see the interplay 
between rates of return and EPI taxes. Later on, we will examine whether the size of 
funds and other financial issues will make such a transition to a more funded system 
feasible or whether such an experiment is a nice academic idea that cannot be 
implemented in Japan because of practical difficulties. We will demonstrate later that 
effective investment policy and implementation of investment decisions, especially large 
cash flows, for GPIF/PRFA may provide the additional returns that can allow for a 
potential reduction of contributions and a more stable long term system. 
 
Let us assume that the goal stated in MM is that a pension system must be designed to 
provide a stable DB benefit, at whatever desired level, and that an attempt must be made 
to (a) lower contributions for a given benefit; and (b) reduce the volatility of contributions. In Japan, it appears that they have recognized this and while the average 
total contribution is 23%, the volatility has been reduced by floating the benefits. 
However, the contribution will rise dramatically after 2100 and hence this is not an 
optimal system from the MM model perspective. In the next section, we will attempt to 
show how the system could potentially be made more optimal through (a) an increase in 
contributions; (b) a higher target return; and (c) some combination of both. In fact, it can 
be shown that for a given investment policy, contributions may be stabilized at a level 
lower than today’s current level. The one key variable which we will monitor to ensure 
the solvency is the PRFA/GPIF Surplus (Table 1, Column 8) which measures the 
difference between inflows and outflows. If this value is negative, and permanently so, 
then the Trust Fund is being depleted as we can see from Chart 1. If we can ensure that 
this variable approaches zero and stays there, then a stable system can be ensured. 
 
For simplicity we utilize a simple model of the EPI forecasts taken from data from the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). This is clearly not the full actuarial 
model that is used to make the long term projections by MHLW, but such a simple model 
allows us to understand the dynamics of the system. We have converted all the data from 
the MHLW projections into analysis based on ratios as a percentage of the wage bill as 
this is the approach followed by MM and normalizes nominal values on parameters such 
as taxes and size of assets by the growth of the economy.  The steps followed to create 
such a table are highlighted in Appendix 2. As a result, we plot the key financial variables 
in Chart 1 for the current reform. As one can see, the Surplus is negative from about 2040 
onwards leading to a sharp decline in the Trust Fund as a percentage of wages, especially since the Cost Ratio is stabilizing in the neighborhood of 26.22% after briefly rising 
beyond 28%. 
 
Chart 1: EPI Financial Dynamics with Current Reform = BASE CASE 
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SS =       
(6)+(5)
SS Surplus 
=    (7)-(1)
Trust Fund 
=      (9)t-
1+(8)
Total Assets/  Benefits 
=(9)/(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4a) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(2005) 21. 91% 14. 29% 3. 09% 0. 00% 17. 38% 2. 06% 19. 44% -2. 47% 110. 11% 5. 03
(2006) 22. 30% 14. 64% 3. 19% 0. 00% 17. 83% 0. 99% 18. 82% -3. 48% 106. 63% 4. 78
(2007) 22. 43% 15. 00% 3. 05% 0. 00% 18. 05% 0. 46% 18. 51% -3. 92% 102. 71% 4. 58
(2008) 22. 80% 15. 35% 3. 14% 0. 00% 18. 49% 1. 52% 20. 01% -2. 79% 99. 92% 4. 38
(2009) 23. 40% 15. 70% 4. 29% 0. 00% 20. 00% 1. 30% 21. 30% -2. 10% 97. 82% 4. 18
(2010) 23. 61% 16. 06% 4. 53% 0. 00% 20. 59% 1. 39% 21. 98% -1. 64% 96. 19% 4. 07
(2011) 23. 78% 16. 41% 4. 52% 0. 00% 20. 93% 1. 46% 22. 39% -1. 39% 94. 80% 3. 99
(2012) 24. 02% 16. 77% 4. 57% 0. 00% 21. 34% 1. 52% 22. 86% -1. 16% 93. 64% 3. 90
(2013) 24. 00% 17. 12% 4. 55% 0. 00% 21. 67% 1. 29% 22. 96% -1. 04% 92. 59% 3. 86
(2014) 23. 89% 17. 47% 4. 65% 0. 00% 22. 12% 1. 34% 23. 46% -0. 43% 92. 17% 3. 86
(2015) 23. 96% 17. 83% 4. 69% 0. 00% 22. 52% 1. 43% 23. 95% -0. 01% 92. 15% 3. 85
(2016) 23. 81% 18. 18% 4. 66% 0. 00% 22. 84% 1. 22% 24. 06% 0. 25% 92. 41% 3. 88
(2017) 23. 53% 18. 30% 4. 67% 0. 00% 22. 97% 0. 95% 23. 92% 0. 39% 92. 80% 3. 94
(2018) 23. 31% 18. 30% 4. 63% 0. 00% 22. 93% 0. 94% 23. 87% 0. 56% 93. 36% 4. 00
(2019) 23. 01% 18. 30% 4. 60% 0. 00% 22. 90% 1. 29% 24. 19% 1. 18% 94. 54% 4. 11
(2020) 22. 77% 18. 30% 4. 52% 0. 00% 22. 82% 1. 34% 24. 17% 1. 40% 95. 94% 4. 21
(2021) 22. 59% 18. 30% 4. 50% 0. 00% 22. 80% 1. 39% 24. 19% 1. 60% 97. 54% 4. 32
(2022) 22. 32% 18. 30% 4. 42% 0. 00% 22. 72% 1. 44% 24. 16% 1. 84% 99. 38% 4. 45
(2023) 22. 16% 18. 30% 4. 46% 0. 00% 22. 76% 1. 75% 24. 51% 2. 35% 101. 74% 4. 59
(2024) 22. 20% 18. 30% 4. 49% 0. 00% 22. 79% 1. 52% 24. 30% 2. 11% 103. 84% 4. 68
(2025) 22. 09% 18. 30% 4. 42% 0. 00% 22. 72% 1. 60% 24. 31% 2. 23% 106. 07% 4. 80
(2026) 22. 08% 18. 30% 4. 41% 0. 00% 22. 71% 1. 96% 24. 66% 2. 58% 108. 65% 4. 92
(2027) 22. 13% 18. 30% 4. 44% 0. 00% 22. 74% 1. 99% 24. 73% 2. 60% 111. 25% 5. 03
(2028) 22. 22% 18. 30% 4. 48% 0. 00% 22. 78% 2. 07% 24. 85% 2. 63% 113. 88% 5. 12
(2029) 22. 46% 18. 30% 4. 48% 0. 00% 22. 78% 2. 44% 25. 22% 2. 76% 116. 65% 5. 19
(2030) 22. 65% 18. 30% 4. 53% 0. 00% 22. 83% 2. 53% 25. 35% 2. 71% 119. 36% 5. 27
(2031) 22. 83% 18. 30% 4. 58% 0. 00% 22. 88% 2. 57% 25. 44% 2. 61% 121. 97% 5. 34
(2032) 23. 11% 18. 30% 4. 63% 0. 00% 22. 93% 2. 95% 25. 88% 2. 77% 124. 74% 5. 40
(2033) 23. 48% 18. 30% 4. 69% 0. 00% 22. 99% 3. 05% 26. 04% 2. 56% 127. 30% 5. 42
(2034) 23. 93% 18. 30% 4. 79% 0. 00% 23. 09% 3. 10% 26. 19% 2. 26% 129. 56% 5. 41
(2035) 24. 33% 18. 30% 4. 88% 0. 00% 23. 18% 3. 16% 26. 34% 2. 02% 131. 58% 5. 41
(2036) 24. 81% 18. 30% 5. 02% 0. 00% 23. 32% 3. 22% 26. 54% 1. 73% 133. 31% 5. 37
(2037) 25. 28% 18. 30% 5. 12% 0. 00% 23. 42% 3. 28% 26. 70% 1. 42% 134. 73% 5. 33
(2038) 25. 79% 18. 30% 5. 21% 0. 00% 23. 51% 3. 34% 26. 85% 1. 06% 135. 79% 5. 26
(2039) 26. 30% 18. 30% 5. 34% 0. 00% 23. 64% 3. 36% 27. 01% 0. 71% 136. 50% 5. 19
(2040) 26. 71% 18. 30% 5. 43% 0. 00% 23. 73% 3. 39% 27. 12% 0. 41% 136. 91% 5. 13
(2041) 27. 11% 18. 30% 5. 57% 0. 00% 23. 87% 3. 41% 27. 28% 0. 16% 137. 08% 5. 06
(2042) 27. 41% 18. 30% 5. 60% 0. 00% 23. 90% 3. 12% 27. 02% -0. 39% 136. 69% 4. 99
(2043) 27. 72% 18. 30% 5. 69% 0. 00% 23. 99% 3. 46% 27. 44% -0. 28% 136. 41% 4. 92
(2044) 28. 01% 18. 30% 5. 76% 0. 00% 24. 06% 3. 13% 27. 19% -0. 82% 135. 60% 4. 84
(2045) 28. 24% 18. 30% 5. 83% 0. 00% 24. 13% 3. 12% 27. 25% -1. 00% 134. 60% 4. 77
(2046) 28. 44% 18. 30% 5. 90% 0. 00% 24. 20% 3. 10% 27. 30% -1. 14% 133. 46% 4. 69
(2047) 28. 63% 18. 30% 6. 01% 0. 00% 24. 31% 3. 09% 27. 40% -1. 23% 132. 23% 4. 62
(2048) 28. 76% 18. 30% 6. 02% 0. 00% 24. 32% 2. 79% 27. 11% -1. 65% 130. 58% 4. 54
(2049) 28. 92% 18. 30% 6. 07% 0. 00% 24. 37% 2. 78% 27. 16% -1. 76% 128. 82% 4. 45
(2050) 29. 00% 18. 30% 6. 09% 0. 00% 24. 39% 2. 78% 27. 16% -1. 84% 126. 98% 4. 38
(2051) 29. 02% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 2. 46% 26. 89% -2. 13% 124. 85% 4. 30
(2052) 29. 06% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 2. 72% 27. 16% -1. 90% 122. 95% 4. 23
(2053) 29. 04% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 2. 43% 26. 86% -2. 18% 120. 78% 4. 16
(2054) 29. 08% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 00% 24. 45% 2. 67% 27. 12% -1. 96% 118. 82% 4. 09
(2055) 28. 99% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 00% 24. 45% 2. 39% 26. 84% -2. 15% 116. 67% 4. 02
(2056) 28. 93% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 00% 24. 45% 2. 35% 26. 80% -2. 13% 114. 54% 3. 96
(2057) 28. 90% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 00% 24. 46% 2. 58% 27. 04% -1. 86% 112. 67% 3. 90
(2058) 28. 81% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 00% 24. 46% 2. 31% 26. 77% -2. 04% 110. 63% 3. 84
(2059) 28. 76% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 00% 24. 46% 2. 28% 26. 74% -2. 03% 108. 61% 3. 78
(2060) 28. 73% 18. 30% 6. 20% 0. 00% 24. 50% 2. 45% 26. 95% -1. 78% 106. 83% 3. 72
(2061) 28. 65% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 2. 24% 26. 68% -1. 97% 104. 86% 3. 66
(2062) 28. 60% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 2. 21% 26. 64% -1. 96% 102. 90% 3. 60
(2063) 28. 57% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 2. 36% 26. 81% -1. 77% 101. 13% 3. 54
(2064) 28. 58% 18. 30% 6. 19% 0. 00% 24. 49% 2. 33% 26. 82% -1. 77% 99. 37% 3. 48
(2065) 28. 54% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 00% 24. 45% 2. 11% 26. 57% -1. 97% 97. 40% 3. 41
(2066) 28. 54% 18. 30% 6. 20% 0. 00% 24. 50% 2. 25% 26. 75% -1. 79% 95. 61% 3. 35
(2067) 28. 50% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 00% 24. 46% 2. 05% 26. 52% -1. 98% 93. 62% 3. 29
(2068) 28. 46% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 2. 02% 26. 45% -2. 00% 91. 62% 3. 22
(2069) 28. 46% 18. 30% 6. 17% 0. 00% 24. 47% 2. 15% 26. 63% -1. 84% 89. 78% 3. 15
(2070) 28. 45% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 96% 26. 41% -2. 05% 87. 73% 3. 08
(2071) 28. 41% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 94% 26. 38% -2. 03% 85. 70% 3. 02
(2072) 28. 37% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 91% 26. 35% -2. 02% 83. 68% 2. 95
(2073) 28. 36% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 85% 26. 29% -2. 07% 81. 61% 2. 88
(2074) 28. 32% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 83% 26. 27% -2. 06% 79. 56% 2. 81
(2075) 28. 31% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 00% 24. 44% 1. 80% 26. 24% -2. 07% 77. 49% 2. 74
(2076) 28. 26% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 1. 62% 26. 05% -2. 21% 75. 28% 2. 66
(2077) 28. 21% 18. 30% 6. 12% 0. 00% 24. 42% 1. 60% 26. 02% -2. 19% 73. 09% 2. 59
(2078) 28. 16% 18. 30% 6. 11% 0. 00% 24. 41% 1. 55% 25. 96% -2. 19% 70. 90% 2. 52
(2079) 28. 13% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 00% 24. 43% 1. 51% 25. 93% -2. 20% 68. 70% 2. 44
(2080) 28. 04% 18. 30% 6. 08% 0. 00% 24. 38% 1. 38% 25. 76% -2. 28% 66. 42% 2. 37
(2081) 27. 98% 18. 30% 6. 09% 0. 00% 24. 39% 1. 34% 25. 73% -2. 25% 64. 17% 2. 29
(2082) 27. 92% 18. 30% 6. 07% 0. 00% 24. 37% 1. 30% 25. 67% -2. 25% 61. 93% 2. 22
(2083) 27. 86% 18. 30% 6. 05% 0. 00% 24. 35% 1. 28% 25. 64% -2. 22% 59. 71% 2. 14
(2084) 27. 76% 18. 30% 6. 03% 0. 00% 24. 33% 1. 16% 25. 48% -2. 27% 57. 43% 2. 07
(2085) 27. 70% 18. 30% 6. 04% 0. 00% 24. 34% 1. 20% 25. 54% -2. 16% 55. 27% 2. 00
(2086) 27. 61% 18. 30% 6. 04% 0. 00% 24. 34% 1. 08% 25. 42% -2. 18% 53. 09% 1. 92
(2087) 27. 48% 18. 30% 6. 01% 0. 00% 24. 31% 0. 97% 25. 28% -2. 20% 50. 89% 1. 85
(2088) 27. 41% 18. 30% 5. 98% 0. 00% 24. 28% 1. 01% 25. 29% -2. 12% 48. 78% 1. 78
(2089) 27. 29% 18. 30% 5. 97% 0. 00% 24. 27% 0. 91% 25. 19% -2. 10% 46. 67% 1. 71
(2090) 27. 19% 18. 30% 5. 94% 0. 00% 24. 24% 0. 88% 25. 12% -2. 07% 44. 61% 1. 64
(2091) 27. 10% 18. 30% 5. 91% 0. 00% 24. 21% 0. 85% 25. 06% -2. 03% 42. 57% 1. 57
(2092) 27. 00% 18. 30% 5. 91% 0. 00% 24. 21% 0. 82% 25. 03% -1. 98% 40. 59% 1. 50
(2093) 26. 91% 18. 30% 5. 90% 0. 00% 24. 20% 0. 79% 24. 99% -1. 93% 38. 67% 1. 44
(2094) 26. 79% 18. 30% 5. 87% 0. 00% 24. 17% 0. 71% 24. 87% -1. 92% 36. 75% 1. 37
(2095) 26. 70% 18. 30% 5. 85% 0. 00% 24. 15% 0. 68% 24. 83% -1. 87% 34. 88% 1. 31
(2096) 26. 61% 18. 30% 5. 82% 0. 00% 24. 12% 0. 65% 24. 77% -1. 83% 33. 05% 1. 24
(2097) 26. 52% 18. 30% 5. 81% 0. 00% 24. 11% 0. 63% 24. 73% -1. 78% 31. 27% 1. 18
(2098) 26. 43% 18. 30% 5. 80% 0. 00% 24. 10% 0. 60% 24. 70% -1. 73% 29. 53% 1. 12
(2099) 26. 33% 18. 30% 5. 78% 0. 00% 24. 08% 0. 54% 24. 62% -1. 72% 27. 81% 1. 06
(2100) 26. 22% 18. 30% 5. 74% 0. 00% 24. 04% 0. 51% 24. 55% -1. 67% 26. 15% 1. 00 
 
 
 SECTION 4: OPTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL REFORM 
 
For simplicity, we will assume that the benefits will remain unchanged per the forecast as 
reducing benefits is politically infeasible. As MM demonstrates, systems where the 
Asset-to-Wage ratio is declining would be second best to systems that are able to satisfy 
the Golden SS Rule and create a partially funded system so that future benefits can be 
paid partly from contributions and partly from returns on the Trust Fund. Given the 
declining profile of the Asset-to-Wage ratio in the Base Case, this provides us with two 
levers to improve the future solvency of the pension system – contribution policy and 
investment policy
13. However, changes to contribution policy raise another complication 
– namely, of inter-generational equity. It is quite obvious that there are numerous changes 
to contributions policy or the government subsidy that can impact the solvency of the 
system. For example, if contributions or subsidies are raised in the early years to improve 
the solvency and lowered thereafter when solvency is improved, then it is implicitly 
taxing current generations to the benefit of future generations. Conversely, keeping the 
system in a dangerous financial situation in the future by keeping contributions/subsidies 
low today is a transfer to current generations from future generations. Therefore, 
following MM, we will attempt to solve this issue by reviewing a one-time increase or 
decrease in contributions so that all generations are impacted equally. In addition, we will 
first look at changes to return of the investment portfolio and then later examine the 
feasibility of such returns and other investment policy implications to achieve such 
returns. 
 
                                                 
13 See also Innovations in Pension Fund Management (2004) by Arun Muralidhar, Japanese edition, edited 
by Mr. Masakazu Arikawa and colleagues from Sony Simple Model: Ensure Solvency through an Increase in Contribution/Subsidy 
 
In this approach, we do not change the investment policy or strategy of GPIF/PRFA and 
attempt to evaluate the increase required in either contributions or subsidy to create a 
system that will be more financially stable through the creation of a sustainable partially 
funded system. As shown in Table 2 and Chart 2, this would require an immediate 
increate in contributions of 0.30% from 2007 (column 4a). We do not show this in the 
table, but delaying this further will only increase the cost. For example, if the increase in 
contribution or subsidy is not made immediately and postponed to 2015, then future 
generations will have to pay 0.44% additional contributions. How can we show that the 
increase in contributions will provide solvency? 
Chart 2: Increasing Contributions to Improve Financial Stability 
Investment Return = 3.2%; Additional Contribution = 0.33% 
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SS =       
(6)+(5)
SS Surplus 
=    (7)-(1)
Trust Fund 
=      (9)t-
1+(8)
Total Assets/  
Benefits 
=(9)/(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4a) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(2005) 21. 91% 14. 29% 3. 09% 0. 00% 17. 38% 2. 06% 19. 44% -2. 47% 110. 11% 5. 03
(2006) 22. 30% 14. 64% 3. 19% 0. 00% 17. 83% 0. 99% 18. 82% -3. 48% 106. 63% 4. 78
(2007) 22. 43% 15. 00% 3. 05% 0. 30% 18. 35% 0. 46% 18. 80% -3. 62% 103. 01% 4. 59
(2008) 22. 80% 15. 35% 3. 14% 0. 30% 18. 79% 1. 53% 20. 31% -2. 49% 100. 52% 4. 41
(2009) 23. 40% 15. 70% 4. 29% 0. 30% 20. 30% 1. 30% 21. 60% -1. 79% 98. 73% 4. 22
(2010) 23. 61% 16. 06% 4. 53% 0. 30% 20. 89% 1. 40% 22. 29% -1. 33% 97. 40% 4. 12
(2011) 23. 78% 16. 41% 4. 52% 0. 30% 21. 23% 1. 48% 22. 71% -1. 07% 96. 33% 4. 05
(2012) 24. 02% 16. 77% 4. 57% 0. 30% 21. 64% 1. 54% 23. 18% -0. 84% 95. 49% 3. 98
(2013) 24. 00% 17. 12% 4. 55% 0. 30% 21. 97% 1. 31% 23. 28% -0. 72% 94. 77% 3. 95
(2014) 23. 89% 17. 47% 4. 65% 0. 30% 22. 42% 1. 37% 23. 79% -0. 10% 94. 67% 3. 96
(2015) 23. 96% 17. 83% 4. 69% 0. 30% 22. 82% 1. 47% 24. 29% 0. 32% 95. 00% 3. 96
(2016) 23. 81% 18. 18% 4. 66% 0. 30% 23. 14% 1. 25% 24. 39% 0. 59% 95. 58% 4. 01
(2017) 23. 53% 18. 30% 4. 67% 0. 30% 23. 27% 0. 98% 24. 25% 0. 72% 96. 31% 4. 09
(2018) 23. 31% 18. 30% 4. 63% 0. 30% 23. 23% 0. 98% 24. 21% 0. 90% 97. 20% 4. 17
(2019) 23. 01% 18. 30% 4. 60% 0. 30% 23. 20% 1. 34% 24. 54% 1. 53% 98. 74% 4. 29
(2020) 22. 77% 18. 30% 4. 52% 0. 30% 23. 12% 1. 40% 24. 52% 1. 75% 100. 49% 4. 41
(2021) 22. 59% 18. 30% 4. 50% 0. 30% 23. 10% 1. 46% 24. 56% 1. 97% 102. 45% 4. 54
(2022) 22. 32% 18. 30% 4. 42% 0. 30% 23. 02% 1. 51% 24. 53% 2. 21% 104. 67% 4. 69
(2023) 22. 16% 18. 30% 4. 46% 0. 30% 23. 06% 1. 84% 24. 91% 2. 75% 107. 41% 4. 85
(2024) 22. 20% 18. 30% 4. 49% 0. 30% 23. 09% 1. 60% 24. 69% 2. 49% 109. 90% 4. 95
(2025) 22. 09% 18. 30% 4. 42% 0. 30% 23. 02% 1. 69% 24. 70% 2. 62% 112. 52% 5. 09
(2026) 22. 08% 18. 30% 4. 41% 0. 30% 23. 01% 2. 07% 25. 08% 3. 00% 115. 52% 5. 23
(2027) 22. 13% 18. 30% 4. 44% 0. 30% 23. 04% 2. 11% 25. 16% 3. 03% 118. 55% 5. 36
(2028) 22. 22% 18. 30% 4. 48% 0. 30% 23. 08% 2. 20% 25. 28% 3. 06% 121. 61% 5. 47
(2029) 22. 46% 18. 30% 4. 48% 0. 30% 23. 08% 2. 60% 25. 69% 3. 23% 124. 84% 5. 56
(2030) 22. 65% 18. 30% 4. 53% 0. 30% 23. 13% 2. 70% 25. 83% 3. 18% 128. 02% 5. 65
(2031) 22. 83% 18. 30% 4. 58% 0. 30% 23. 18% 2. 75% 25. 92% 3. 09% 131. 12% 5. 74
(2032) 23. 11% 18. 30% 4. 63% 0. 30% 23. 23% 3. 17% 26. 40% 3. 29% 134. 41% 5. 82
(2033) 23. 48% 18. 30% 4. 69% 0. 30% 23. 29% 3. 28% 26. 57% 3. 09% 137. 50% 5. 86
(2034) 23. 93% 18. 30% 4. 79% 0. 30% 23. 39% 3. 35% 26. 74% 2. 81% 140. 31% 5. 86
(2035) 24. 33% 18. 30% 4. 88% 0. 30% 23. 48% 3. 42% 26. 90% 2. 58% 142. 88% 5. 87
(2036) 24. 81% 18. 30% 5. 02% 0. 30% 23. 62% 3. 49% 27. 11% 2. 31% 145. 19% 5. 85
(2037) 25. 28% 18. 30% 5. 12% 0. 30% 23. 72% 3. 57% 27. 29% 2. 00% 147. 19% 5. 82
(2038) 25. 79% 18. 30% 5. 21% 0. 30% 23. 81% 3. 65% 27. 46% 1. 67% 148. 86% 5. 77
(2039) 26. 30% 18. 30% 5. 34% 0. 30% 23. 94% 3. 68% 27. 63% 1. 33% 150. 20% 5. 71
(2040) 26. 71% 18. 30% 5. 43% 0. 30% 24. 03% 3. 72% 27. 76% 1. 05% 151. 25% 5. 66
(2041) 27. 11% 18. 30% 5. 57% 0. 30% 24. 17% 3. 77% 27. 93% 0. 82% 152. 07% 5. 61
(2042) 27. 41% 18. 30% 5. 60% 0. 30% 24. 20% 3. 46% 27. 66% 0. 25% 152. 31% 5. 56
(2043) 27. 72% 18. 30% 5. 69% 0. 30% 24. 29% 3. 85% 28. 13% 0. 41% 152. 73% 5. 51
(2044) 28. 01% 18. 30% 5. 76% 0. 30% 24. 36% 3. 50% 27. 86% -0. 14% 152. 58% 5. 45
(2045) 28. 24% 18. 30% 5. 83% 0. 30% 24. 43% 3. 51% 27. 93% -0. 31% 152. 27% 5. 39
(2046) 28. 44% 18. 30% 5. 90% 0. 30% 24. 50% 3. 51% 28. 01% -0. 43% 151. 84% 5. 34
(2047) 28. 63% 18. 30% 6. 01% 0. 30% 24. 61% 3. 51% 28. 12% -0. 51% 151. 33% 5. 29
(2048) 28. 76% 18. 30% 6. 02% 0. 30% 24. 62% 3. 19% 27. 81% -0. 95% 150. 38% 5. 23
(2049) 28. 92% 18. 30% 6. 07% 0. 30% 24. 67% 3. 20% 27. 88% -1. 04% 149. 34% 5. 16
(2050) 29. 00% 18. 30% 6. 09% 0. 30% 24. 69% 3. 22% 27. 90% -1. 10% 148. 24% 5. 11
(2051) 29. 02% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 87% 27. 60% -1. 42% 146. 82% 5. 06
(2052) 29. 06% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 3. 20% 27. 94% -1. 12% 145. 70% 5. 01
(2053) 29. 04% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 87% 27. 61% -1. 43% 144. 27% 4. 97
(2054) 29. 08% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 30% 24. 75% 3. 19% 27. 94% -1. 14% 143. 13% 4. 92
(2055) 28. 99% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 30% 24. 75% 2. 88% 27. 62% -1. 36% 141. 77% 4. 89
(2056) 28. 93% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 30% 24. 75% 2. 86% 27. 60% -1. 33% 140. 44% 4. 85
(2057) 28. 90% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 30% 24. 76% 3. 16% 27. 92% -0. 98% 139. 45% 4. 83
(2058) 28. 81% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 30% 24. 76% 2. 86% 27. 62% -1. 19% 138. 26% 4. 80
(2059) 28. 76% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 30% 24. 76% 2. 84% 27. 60% -1. 16% 137. 10% 4. 77
(2060) 28. 73% 18. 30% 6. 20% 0. 30% 24. 80% 3. 09% 27. 89% -0. 84% 136. 26% 4. 74
(2061) 28. 65% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 86% 27. 59% -1. 06% 135. 20% 4. 72
(2062) 28. 60% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 84% 27. 58% -1. 02% 134. 18% 4. 69
(2063) 28. 57% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 3. 08% 27. 83% -0. 75% 133. 43% 4. 67
(2064) 28. 58% 18. 30% 6. 19% 0. 30% 24. 79% 3. 07% 27. 86% -0. 72% 132. 71% 4. 64
(2065) 28. 54% 18. 30% 6. 15% 0. 30% 24. 75% 2. 82% 27. 57% -0. 96% 131. 74% 4. 62
(2066) 28. 54% 18. 30% 6. 20% 0. 30% 24. 80% 3. 05% 27. 85% -0. 70% 131. 04% 4. 59
(2067) 28. 50% 18. 30% 6. 16% 0. 30% 24. 76% 2. 81% 27. 57% -0. 93% 130. 12% 4. 57
(2068) 28. 46% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 81% 27. 54% -0. 92% 129. 20% 4. 54
(2069) 28. 46% 18. 30% 6. 17% 0. 30% 24. 77% 3. 03% 27. 80% -0. 66% 128. 54% 4. 52
(2070) 28. 45% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 81% 27. 55% -0. 90% 127. 64% 4. 49
(2071) 28. 41% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 82% 27. 56% -0. 86% 126. 79% 4. 46
(2072) 28. 37% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 82% 27. 56% -0. 81% 125. 98% 4. 44
(2073) 28. 36% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 79% 27. 53% -0. 83% 125. 15% 4. 41
(2074) 28. 32% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 80% 27. 54% -0. 78% 124. 36% 4. 39
(2075) 28. 31% 18. 30% 6. 14% 0. 30% 24. 74% 2. 82% 27. 56% -0. 76% 123. 61% 4. 37
(2076) 28. 26% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 59% 27. 32% -0. 94% 122. 66% 4. 34
(2077) 28. 21% 18. 30% 6. 12% 0. 30% 24. 72% 2. 61% 27. 33% -0. 88% 121. 78% 4. 32
(2078) 28. 16% 18. 30% 6. 11% 0. 30% 24. 71% 2. 59% 27. 30% -0. 86% 120. 92% 4. 29
(2079) 28. 13% 18. 30% 6. 13% 0. 30% 24. 73% 2. 57% 27. 30% -0. 84% 120. 08% 4. 27
(2080) 28. 04% 18. 30% 6. 08% 0. 30% 24. 68% 2. 41% 27. 09% -0. 95% 119. 13% 4. 25
(2081) 27. 98% 18. 30% 6. 09% 0. 30% 24. 69% 2. 40% 27. 09% -0. 89% 118. 25% 4. 23
(2082) 27. 92% 18. 30% 6. 07% 0. 30% 24. 67% 2. 39% 27. 06% -0. 86% 117. 39% 4. 20
(2083) 27. 86% 18. 30% 6. 05% 0. 30% 24. 65% 2. 43% 27. 09% -0. 77% 116. 62% 4. 19
(2084) 27. 76% 18. 30% 6. 03% 0. 30% 24. 63% 2. 26% 26. 88% -0. 87% 115. 75% 4. 17
(2085) 27. 70% 18. 30% 6. 04% 0. 30% 24. 64% 2. 42% 27. 06% -0. 64% 115. 11% 4. 16
(2086) 27. 61% 18. 30% 6. 04% 0. 30% 24. 64% 2. 26% 26. 89% -0. 71% 114. 39% 4. 14
(2087) 27. 48% 18. 30% 6. 01% 0. 30% 24. 61% 2. 09% 26. 70% -0. 78% 113. 62% 4. 14
(2088) 27. 41% 18. 30% 5. 98% 0. 30% 24. 58% 2. 26% 26. 84% -0. 57% 113. 05% 4. 12
(2089) 27. 29% 18. 30% 5. 97% 0. 30% 24. 57% 2. 11% 26. 68% -0. 60% 112. 44% 4. 12
(2090) 27. 19% 18. 30% 5. 94% 0. 30% 24. 54% 2. 12% 26. 66% -0. 53% 111. 91% 4. 12
(2091) 27. 10% 18. 30% 5. 91% 0. 30% 24. 51% 2. 13% 26. 64% -0. 46% 111. 46% 4. 11
(2092) 27. 00% 18. 30% 5. 91% 0. 30% 24. 51% 2. 14% 26. 65% -0. 36% 111. 10% 4. 11
(2093) 26. 91% 18. 30% 5. 90% 0. 30% 24. 50% 2. 15% 26. 65% -0. 26% 110. 84% 4. 12
(2094) 26. 79% 18. 30% 5. 87% 0. 30% 24. 47% 2. 02% 26. 49% -0. 30% 110. 54% 4. 13
(2095) 26. 70% 18. 30% 5. 85% 0. 30% 24. 45% 2. 04% 26. 49% -0. 20% 110. 33% 4. 13
(2096) 26. 61% 18. 30% 5. 82% 0. 30% 24. 42% 2. 06% 26. 48% -0. 12% 110. 21% 4. 14
(2097) 26. 52% 18. 30% 5. 81% 0. 30% 24. 41% 2. 08% 26. 49% -0. 03% 110. 18% 4. 16
(2098) 26. 43% 18. 30% 5. 80% 0. 30% 24. 40% 2. 11% 26. 50% 0. 08% 110. 26% 4. 17
(2099) 26. 33% 18. 30% 5. 78% 0. 30% 24. 38% 2. 00% 26. 38% 0. 04% 110. 30% 4. 19
(2100) 26. 22% 18. 30% 5. 74% 0. 30% 24. 34% 2. 03% 26. 37% 0. 15% 110. 45% 4. 21   
The easiest way to see this result is to notice three key variables in Chart 2. First, the 
black line from the bottom left corner of the picture that is drawn at 0.33% denotes the 
“Top Up Contribution” or additional subsidy included in the system. This additional 
resource impacts the GPIF/PRFA Surplus so that now the red line is approximately zero 
closer to the end of the forecast period of 2100. In Chart 1 (No Reform Base Case), this 
line falls below 0% in 2039 and stays below 0% and hence such a reform is a clear 
improvement to the financial stability of the system. Equally important, the Trust Fund is 
stabilized at a level equal to approximately 1.1 times wages. The asset-to-wage ratio is 
also currently 1.1 and rises as surpluses lead to additional accumulation to a level of 
approximately 1.55 times, but then declines as pensions peak around 2045 and stabilizes 
at 1.1 Such an increase in the proportion of assets to wages from 1 time wages to 1.5 
times wages and then falling back to 1.1 times wages is less of an issue for Japan than it 
was for the U.S.A. This follows. because Japan has wisely chosen to invest its portfolio 
with a global perspective, whereas initial recommendations for the U.S.A. in MM 
suggested a purely domestic portfolio to address political realities. Most critically, the 
U.S. Trust Fund had not been invested in marketable securities to begin with. Therefore, 
in the U.S., the issue of the SS Trust Fund “crowding out” private investment and 
influencing capital markets is more severe than for Japan as in Japan assets are invested 
globally.  
 
Now the cost ratio of 26.22% in steady state is being met through total contributions of 
24.3% (18.3% + 5.7%+0.33%) and the balance through the return on investment which is 
equal to 1.9% of wages. The interest element of 1.9% is generated by a nominal return of 3.2% deflated by nominal wage growth of 2.1%, combined with the decline in labor force 
and the difference multiplied by the Asset to Wage ratio of 1.1. One can argue that this 
additional contribution is not needed as the current reform ensures that all benefits can be 
paid for the next 95 years. However, from a long term perspective, maintaining a partially 
funded system is preferable to reverting to pure PAYGO and hence this simulation. 
 
A partially funded system is nothing but a combination of a pure PAYGO and a fully 
funded system, with the degree of funding determining the weights of each. Hence, we 
can split up this mixed system into a fully funded and a pure PAYGO system. The 
technique for conducting such an analysis is described in MM, Chapter 8. Effectively, we 
can consider 2.2% being directed to the funded system, which with an asset-to-wage ratio 
of 1.1 and a gross return of 3.2%, generates total resources of 4.1%.
14 The balance of the 
contribution = 22.14% (24.3% - 2.2%) combined with 4.1% from the funded system 
results in the payment of the cost ratio of 26.3%. 
 
 
Notice a big difference here from the Base Case. While in the Base Case, the ratio of 
Assets-to-Benefits is gradually targeting 1 in 2100; in the MM approach, we are targeting 
a ratio between 4 and 5 which is much closer to current levels than in the Base Case. 
Hence the fundamental difference between the current Japanese reform approach and the 
MM approach is to maintain a partially funded system (MM) as opposed to reverting to a 
PAYGO system (current Japanese reform). 
 
                                                 
14 Such a system would be generating a replacement rate on average salary of 10.77% on the assumption of 
40 years of service and 18 years of life expectancy post retirement, with inflation at 1%, growth of nominal 
wages at 2.1% and return of assets at 3.2%. Partial Model: Ensure solvency through higher returns 
 
In this approach, we evaluate the impact on the system if instead of targeting just 3.2% 
nominal returns (or 1.1% above the annual rate of increase of wages), the MHLW 
directed PRFA to earn a higher rate. This return is not set arbitrarily. Instead, using the 
MM approach the target level is set at a rate of return that creates a stable pension system 
(based on the ability to pay pensions without depleting the asset-to-wage ratio) and hence 
is set 0.3% higher at 3.5%. As Chart 3 demonstrates, earning a higher investment return 
on the Trust Fund by 0.3% would create a stable system where the Asset-to-Wage ratio is 
stabilized at 1.3 times wages. As we can see in Chart 3, the cost ratio of 26.3% can be 
met easily through a total contribution of 24.04% (18.3% + 6.1%) and the balance 2.2% 
from the returns of the Trust Fund. Coincidentally, with a higher target rate of return, the 
required asset-to-wage ratio to ensure solvency is only marginally higher (than the 
current level) at 1.3 times and this has important implications for whether such a solution 
is feasible.  
 
We provide such a simulation in this paper as it is politically more feasible to improve the 
long term solvency of the system through appropriate investment policy as opposed to 
raising contributions, especially since a higher return may create a more stable system for 
the future. We will show that such an additional return is easy to achieve given the 
current fund structure of the PRFA and the likely changes occurring to the portfolio from 
maturing loans and related cash flows. It is quite amazing that just a small increase in the 
target rate of return can convert the Japanese pension system from a potentially unstable long term PAYGO system to a very viable and long term financially stable partially 
funded system. In discussing such initial findings with many Japanese scholars, our 
understanding is that such insights were not discussed during the reform process and 
hence the importance of such simulations. 
 
Chart 3: Improving Financial Stability through Higher Investment Returns  
Investment Return of 3.5%; No Additional Contribution 
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Ideal Model: Ensure solvency through better returns and lower contributions 
 
Given the results from the previous simulations, we went the additional step to ask what 
would be the impact on contributions/subsidies if the PRFA portfolio had a return of 
4.2% nominal. We will examine the feasibility and possible implications for asset management operations of PRFA later, but as shown in Chart 4, continuing in a similar 
approach, we can show that if the investment return was raised by 1% to 4.2%, then no 
additional contribution would be required, but instead contributions can be cut by 0.9% 
immediately!! In Chart 4, the “Top Up Contribution” lies below the 0% line, the PRFA 
Surplus is stabilized at 0%, and the Trust Fund approaches 1.2 times wages. 
 
Again, we can split up this mixed system into a fully funded and a pure PAYGO system. 
Effectively, we can see this at 1.93% being directed to the funded system, which with a 
asset-to-wage ratio of 1.2 and a gross return of 4.2%, generates total resources of 
5.13%.
15 The balance of the contribution = 21.21% (23.14% - 1.93%) combined with 
5.13% from the funded system results in the payment of the cost ratio of 26.3%. 
 
Given such a stunning result that maintaining the current investment return target of 3.2% 
will require an immediate increase in social security taxes of 0.3% to create a more stable 
system as suggested in MM, whereas generating a higher return of 4.2% could lead to a 
permanent reduction of contributions of 0.90%, one has to conclude that the investment 
policy and investment procedures of GPIF/PRFA may need to be reviewed, but with a 
much higher goal of ensuring the long term solvency of the pension system. However, in 
order to move in such a direction, one must be convinced that the benefit of taking on any 
additional political risk of targeting a higher investment return is worth the benefit of 
lowering contributions and also the volatility of contributions as the greater the 
                                                 
15 Such a system would be generating a replacement rate on average salary of 12.66% on the assumption of 
40 years of service and 18 years of life expectancy post retirement, with inflation at 1%, growth of nominal 
wages at 2.1% and return of assets at 4.2%. This suggests a greater contribution from the funded system in 
paying benefits versus a model with a lower return on assets. component of funding, the less susceptible the system is to small changes in population 
or productivity growth as shown in Appendix 1. 
 
Chart 4: Lowering Pension Taxes while Preserving Financial Stability through 
Higher Investment Returns 
  
Investment Return of 4.2%; Reduction in Contribution = -0.9% 
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In the next few sections we examine the impact of a passive change in the target 
allocation and other mechanisms to improve returns, combined with a discussion of how 
such investments can be protected from political manipulation or frequent changes as 
investing in capital markets implies volatility of returns. As MM argue, the government 
with an infinite time horizon has the ability to bear this risk, especially since it has 
smartly decided to retain DB benefits when most other countries want to shift to DC and transfer investment risk to participants (who are least capable of bearing it).  In short, the 
benefit of compounding returns at a rate of growth that is potentially higher than the 
growth of real income allows for resources for pensions to be gathered at a greater rate. 
However, to gain the advantage of compounding, reforms cannot be delayed because as 
shown above, every delay in reforms implied additional costs to future generations. 
 
 
SECTION 5: BACKGROUND ON INVESTMENTS: 
 
 
MM Approach to Managing Portfolio and Resulting Volatility – “The Swap” 
 
 
MM start with the key innovative conclusion that a DB pension fund can be ensured by 
guaranteeing a particular rate of return to participants. This has also been shown 
implicitly in the simulations above and in the Appendix 1. Since MM favors partially 
funded systems to PAYGO systems, they provide a series of investment 
recommendations as to the portfolio composition, management and governance of the 
assets to demonstrate that recommendations by other analysts to privatize Social Security 
were based on poor assumptions of incompetence and corruption on the part of 
government officials and that investment returns can be ensured by appropriate policies 
and procedures.  
 
They recommend that the portfolio be invested in global capital markets, in a market 
capitalization weighted approach (to remove relative arbitrariness in portfolio selection 
made by the Clinton Administration to favor a bond heavy portfolio). However, they 
recognized that it would be politically difficult to have the Social Security Administration (SSA) report variable returns to an unsophisticated public. To ensure that the volatility of 
returns was not transferred to the SSA, they proposed an innovative swap between the 
Treasury in the United States and SSA. This is an off-market transaction, but in effect the 
Treasury would pay SSA the required guaranteed return (based on the expected return of 
the portfolio) and receive the volatile market-based returns from SSA. This would ensure 
that SSA would receive investment returns that were fixed annually and with zero 
volatility thereby convincing the lay person that Social Security was well funded and not 
buffeted by market volatility. Their recommendation was based on the assumption that it 
is the responsibility of the government to provide Social Security and given its infinite 
life, was more capable of bearing investment volatility than any individual (this is less 
relevant for Japan that is committed to defined benefits with government sponsorship). 
This swap would also prevent the political manipulation of assets as any poor 
investments of the SSA portfolio would lead to low returns on the portfolio and therefore 
lower payments by SSA to Treasury, in turn leading to losses for Treasury in the swap. 
This was an attempt by MM to make any manipulation of assets transparent and costed 
immediately as opposed to transferring such problems to future generations. However, to 
the extent that the guaranteed rate was vastly different from actual experience (as capital 
markets may provide a higher or lower return than expected), they constructed a 
balancing mechanism whereby contributions would be kept flexible, but with very strict 
rules as to when and how contributions would be modified. MM were also very forceful 
that this portfolio should be managed by a professional investment team under the 
supervision of a Blue Ribbon Board, that would be independent of political interference, 
much like the Canadian and Irish example. MM also suggested that initially it would probably make sense to invest these assets in a relatively passive manner, though this 
could lead to problems in the capital markets if a large portion of the local stock market 
was not managed with a keen eye on corporate governance etc. Hence, MM opened up 
the possibility that external managers could be hired to outperform such benchmarks 
through their superior knowledge of valuations, while at the same time ensuring that SSA 
earned a return close to the benchmark return. 
 
GPIF/PRFA Investment Issues and Issues Specific to Japan
16  
 
The target return of the PRFA fund is set 3.5% nominal, but with expenses and other 
costs, the net return is expected to be 3.2% with a standard deviation of 5.5%. It appears 
that in the reform process discussion, most of the focus was spent on setting the benefits 
and contribution levels, and less focus on examining the impact of various investment 
returns on these two parameters. In addition, it was made clear that one of the key 
interests of Japanese politicians was to reduce the size of the assets of the GPIF/PRFA 
(i.e., government control), but it is quite likely that the trade-off between reducing the 
size of assets and possible raising of contributions was not highlighted in these 
discussions. Hence the simulations in the previous sections are of particular interest and 
the question is whether additional returns can be secured, if so how, and can the political 
issues be managed in Japan so that contributions may even be lowered in the future? 
Clearly, some of the desire to invest the GPIF/PRFA portfolio largely in bonds (and not 
mark them to market) may reflect the desire to not have to report variable and negative 
                                                 
16 I have benefited from listening to a presentation by Mr. Kawase, President of PRFA, at the Nomura 
Securities Conference in Tokyo, November 2006. Again, any errors in understanding are mine. rates of return to the public, who may see such short term variations in the GPIF/PRFA 
portfolio as an indication that their pensions are at risk. 
 
The process of converting the return target to a practical portfolio is delegated to 
GPIF/PRFA, which is advised by a number of academic experts and representatives from 
various vested groups (employers, employees etc). Over the next three years, the fiscal 
loan fund will be converted to fixed income instruments (indexed to the Nomura BPI) 
over time thereby ensuring that the portfolio will be a fully marketable portfolio in 3 
years. For FY 2008, the target for GPIF/PRFA will be as follows:  
 
Domestic Fixed Income (Nomura BPI Index) = 67%,  
Domestic Stocks (TOPIX) = 11%;  
International Stocks (MSCI-KOKUSAI) = 9%,  
Foreign Bonds (Citi World Govt Bond ex Japan) = 8%  
Cash = 5%.  
 
This can be seen as a portfolio 75% in Bonds, 20% in Equities and 5% in Cash. We will 
term this long term portfolio the Strategic Asset Allocation or SAA. Most of the 
investments will be made passively and indications are that as much as 80% will be 
invested passively. Given the relatively low target return, the focus for PRFA will be 
more on managing “beta” than on trying to generate alpha. 
 The basic assumption is that government bonds will provide a nominal return of 
approximately 3% (inflation is estimated at 1%) and that equities is expected to provide 
an equity risk premium of approximately 3%. Hence, the GPIF/PRFA portfolio can be 
weighted quite heavily in government bonds and Cash to achieve the target rate of 3.2%, 
after costs, with minimal volatility. In addition, there appears to be an implicit restriction 
that the foreign stock allocation should be below that of the Japanese stock market. Some 
estimate appears to have been made as to whether GPIF/PRFA holdings in any one 
market is likely to constitute a substantial portion of a market given the size of the fund 
(and potential impact on market liquidity) and the general conclusions appears to be that 
it is not the case.
17 However, in the case of the government bond portfolio, many of the 
listed bonds are held by government entities and not traded and hence analyses on 
GPIF/PRFA holding versus total market capitalization or total bond issuance may 
underestimate the true impact on liquidity in this market. The key point here is that PRFA 
is very sensitive to the issue of market impact of its portfolio given the substantial size of 
assets exceeding Yen 100 Trillion (approximately USD 1 Trillion). 
 
One practical reality of managing portfolios, is that impossible to maintain a portfolio at a 
fixed set of weights since markets are dynamic and moving every day at different rates of 
return thereby affecting the relative weights of each of these asset categories. Therefore, 
ranges have been set around the SAA within which the portfolio is allowed to deviate. 
                                                 
17 We base this comment on a presentation by Mr. Suzuki at the Pacific Pensions Institute Conference in 
Seoul, Korea in June 2006. The author did not attend the conference, but received a copy of the 
presentation and hence there may be problems in interpretation. Based on current GPIF/PRFA allocations 
(as of June 2006) to Domestic Bonds of 36 Trillion Yen is only 7.6% of the domestic bond market 
capitalization; Domestic Stocks at 17 Trillion Yen is only 5.5% of domestic stock market capitalization; 
Foreign bonds at  8% of the fund is only 0.9% of market share and foreign stocks of 10 Trillion Yen is only 
0.4% of market capitalization. 
 This is very common practice for pension investment portfolios. The permissible ranges 
across assets is very wide: in Domestic Bonds +/-8%; Domestic Stocks +/-6%; Foreign 
Assets +/-5%. Because there is a risk to the downside of the fixed income portfolio if 
interest rates rise given the historical level of Japanese rates, it appears from the publicly 
available literature that GPIF/PRFA is planning to use “Buy and Hold” accounting, 
which carries the asset at par as opposed to marking-to-market lower if rates rise. As 
indicated earlier, such accounting policies appear to be an attempt to insulate such 
institutions from naïve criticisms that pensions are unsafe because returns are negative for 
a given period. In an interesting way, this is implicitly a variation of the swap mechanism 
suggested by MM, but just for the fixed income portfolio. 
 
Can GPIF/PRFA Achieve a Higher Rate of Return Given the Size of the Portfolio 
and Other Restrictions? 
 
It seems like Japan is already effectively creating the swap mechanism described in MM 
through the approach of not marking fixed income assets to market. However, we would 
recommend that PRFA and MHLW consider the swap approach proposed in MM as 
opposed to “Buy and Hold” accounting just for fixed income assets as the swap approach 
(a) would apply to the entire portfolio and removes the problem that short term negative 
performance in markets causes people to accuse the government or GPIF/PRFA 
employees of bad asset management or worsening the long term solvency of EPI; and (b) 
makes any potential deficits transparent and prevents issues of weak solvency from being 
hidden for many years.   
In addition to the volatility of returns as a source of concern, perhaps the most 
contentious issue for Japan is less the rate of return of investments than the size of the 
fund. We have addressed the issue of volatility of returns through the idea of the swap 
and will now address the issue of the size of assets. There are two angles to the size of 
assets problem; (a) a political one of people feeling that too large a portfolio in 
government hands is dangerous; and (b) the economic aspect of managing a large fund 
and whether the size is large in nominal terms or relative to wages. 
 
On the political front, it appears that the case for partial funding may not have been made 
as explicitly as in MM. From our discussions, it appears that the appearance of a large 
fund under government control was the key issue. However, one must trade-off the 
potential benefits against any perceived problems and in this case, one could argue that 
the goal of creating a financially stable long terms system is truly worth striving to 
achieve, unless the large asset pool truly creates economic problems. Therefore, if the 
political parties can be convinced of the virtues of creating a partially funded system, 
with the intent of making the system more financially stable for the long term with a 
potentially lower longer term tax on employees and employers, then there are a few 
different choices to consider for raising the target rate of return that fall within the 
context of generating returns purely from beta investments (and not investing in hedge 
funds etc.).  
 From an economic perspective, one cannot see the size of the fund in nominal Yen terms 
without normalizing for the growth of the economy and hence our focus on reporting the 
Trust Fund as a percentage of wages. As can be seen from Charts 1 – 4, under our 
proposed reform options of raising contributions or returns, the asset-to-wage ratio is 
generally in the neighborhood of current levels and hence should ideally not create any 
economic (or ideally even political issues) that are different from today. Therefore, unless 
there is a serious concern about the current asset-to-wage ratio of approximately 1.3, one 
must question why there is an issue with such a level being maintained as a long term 
steady state level. In the U.S. case, the ratio had to rise from 0.3 to 1.5 which was a 
meaningful increase – in the Japanese case, the long term level is so similar to the current 
level that the economic case should be very simple. If the current asset-to-wage ratio is 
not crowding out private investment or creating disruption in global market (and to date, 
there is no evidence of the case), then there is no case against retaining a moderate level 
of assets to maintain a partially funded system, especially when the fund is invested in 
global capital markets. 
 
We have tried to dispel the objections that could arise from a political or economic 
perspective to keeping the asset-to-wage ratio between 1.1 and 1.3 (depending on the 
solution chosen). However, the approach taken to achieve these lofty goals of creating 
long term pension financial stability can lead to additional political problems. We now 
address how the rate of return of the GPIF/PRFA portfolio may be achieved. 
 In terms of raising the return on the portfolio, there are many possibilities but for 
simplicity
18, we will examine two simple approaches as they require minimal changes to 
current PRFA/GPIF operations: (a) Changing the long term SAA to target a higher 
expected return without changing the asset composition; and (b) Managing the assets 
effectively to generate potentially higher returns without changing the SAA or overall 
rebalancing policies. In addition, we will focus the attention of the analysis primarily on 
raising returns by approximately 0.3% to create a long-term stable partially funded 
system without permanent changes to the contribution rate. Should policy makers decide 
that an even higher rate of return of 1% leads to desirable welfare gains because they can 
lead to lower contributions, then some variant or combination of the approaches listed 
below can be adopted quite easily. 
 
Changing the Long Term SAA 
 
The simplest approach to raising the expected return on the assets would be to increase 
the allocation of equities by 10%-15%. With a 3% equity premium, an increase in equity 
of 10%-15% would lead to an additional return of 0.3%-0.45%. It would also potentially 
lead to a slightly more volatile portfolio, but since we do not have access to the 
assumptions made on volatilities or correlations across assets, we are unable to comment 
on the exact magnitude of the change. This incremental additional volatility is not much 
                                                 
18 Among the many possibilities that we do not consider are investing in alternative assets such as real 
estate and private equity, and targeting active management as a source of excess returns over the 
benchmarks. One can imagine that the portfolio management personnel at GPIF/PRFA are under pressure 
to consider active management strategies, but we will show that focusing on the beta assets can provide 
adequate opportunities for adding the needed returns without having to create new infrastructure to 
examine external active managers. of an issue if the swap mechanism is implemented, but could lead to optical/political 
problems if the swap is not implemented. This follows as an increased allocation to 
stocks would increase the expected return, but could potentially lead to additional 
negative periods of performance. MM examined such possibilities in the context of U.S. 
data and found that increasing allocations to equities, based on historical data, increased 
volatility, but did not impact other typical pension risk measures. Future research on 
portfolio allocations by GPIF/PRFA staff or research analysts should replicate the MM 
simulations on various asset allocations with Japanese data. 
 
It appears that the more pressing political issue is whether it makes sense to increase the 
allocation of the portfolio to Domestic Stocks? MM provide a series of asset allocation 
choices between equities and fixed income assets for the U.S. market and show that 
keeping allocations to fixed income assets high has the effect of lowering the rate of 
return, but also increasing the risk of not achieving pension objectives (along multiple 
risk parameters). Given that the current ownership of PRFA of the total TOPIX market 
cap is already 5.5%, a 10-15% increase in the allocation to the TOPIX could lead to a 
meaningful percentage of the market being held by a single entity and can cause liquidity 
problems for other investors and PRFA. The other simple alternative would be to invest 
all of the assets in foreign equity, which given the percentage of market capitalization 
owned by PRFA is going to have a miniscule impact on market liquidity. However, such 
an approach will cause the allocation percentage of foreign stocks to exceed the 
allocation percentage to domestic stocks and this could lead to political problems given 
the previously stated objective that the allocation to foreign stocks should be lower than domestic stocks. Hence our earlier recommendation of creating allocations to assets that 
reflect market capitalization weights of assets as this makes allocation decisions less 
political and arbitrary and using a market capitalization basis, just for equities, would 
make a clear case for a larger allocation to foreign stocks than domestic stocks. 
 
The one additional advantage to investing in foreign stocks, assuming that they are 
invested on an unhedged basis
19, is that it will lead to sales of yen and purchases of 
foreign currencies, which can have the effect of leading to a depreciation of the yen. This 
can be beneficial to Japanese businesses that compete globally and also for monetary 
policy. Given the likely debate over investing additional assets abroad, the compromise 
may be to invest some portion in the domestic market and some portion in the foreign 
market so as to not violate the principle that foreign stock allocations not exceed 
domestic stock allocations.  
 
We have ignored the possibility of including other assets into the SAA, but it is possible 
to increase the expected return without increasing volatility of additional asset classes are 
included that are not highly correlated with the existing assets. Many pension funds 
globally have invested in hedge funds and other strategies and given the marginal 
increase required in the expected return, we do not advocate such an approach. However, 
it may be wise to consider other liquid, transparent and broadly accepted asset classes to 
increase the return while managing volatility. 
 
                                                 
19 See “Hedging Currency Risk in International Trade and Investment (2006)”, by M. Arikawa and A. 
Muralidhar, Center for Advanced Research in Finance Working Paper, University of Tokyo. It covers  
issues relating to currency hedging of foreign investments by Japanese pension funds. Increasing Returns by 0.3% Through Effective Management of Current Assets. 
 
There are four key observations that we make to present an alternative option to changing 
the SAA as a means of raising GPIF/PRFA returns without changing any administrative 
issues or creating political problems. The four observations are: (a) it is impossible to 
maintain a portfolio constantly at its SAA weights because markets are moving daily; (b) 
GPIF/PRFA has implemented extremely wide ranges around each asset class to prevent 
constant rebalancing; (c) the government loans are maturing in the next few years and 
will be sent to GPIF/PRFA as cash flows that require investing in markets and where and 
how these cash flows are invested can be a source of return (or if badly made a source of 
negative returns); and (d) the cash flow position of the fund will change rapidly as in FY 
2008, GPIF/PRFA will experience cash out flows. In effect, these four observations lead 
us to the recommendation that GPIF/PRFA consider “Intelligent Rebalancing” or 
“Dynamic and Intelligent Beta Management” as a means to add additional return from 
their day-to-day asset operations.
20
 
In short, every decision that is made by GPIF/PRFA staff to invest the cash inflows or 
outflows affects the final return – in short, GPIF/PRFA staff are taking active bets even if 
they are keeping the asset allocations within the prescribed ranges around the SAA. 
Equally important, since asset markets go through cycles and are not highly correlated, 
                                                 
20 See “The Case for View Based Dynamic ALM for Japanese Pension Funds: A New Approach to 
Liability Driven Investing” by M. Arikawa, A. Muralidhar and S. Muralidhar, Center for Advanced 
Research in Finance Working Paper, University of Tokyo. This paper expands on the concept highlighted 
here, but from an asset-liability management perspective and shows how innovative Japanese funds can 
implement a smart rebalancing to improve their solvency. 
 there will be periods when it will be optimal to be allocating more to one asset class as 
opposed to another. In the past, pension funds have allocated these cash flows with the 
objective to always trying to achieve the SAA, but such an approach which we call 
“Naïve Rebalancing” has the potential of causing staff to buy assets which are already 
declining or have a high probability of declining in the future. Under the “Intelligent 
Rebalancing” method, GPIF/PRFA staff should leverage their investment committee or 
consultant/external manager expertise to build simple rules based on observable 
economic factors to help them understand what the likely impact will be on asset 
performance from such phenomena. In short, the operations and governance of 
GPIF/PRFA can be greatly enhanced because they will adopt the same investment 
practices that are used by the best asset managers globally. Moreover, creating such 
formal rules across all assets creates a disciplined investment process.  
 
To be more explicit, Intelligent Rebalancing requires a responsible investor such as 
GPIF/PRFA to determine what factors affect whether the assets in their portfolio will 
perform well or poorly based on current market factors and make appropriate decisions 
on beta assets to reflect such analysis.
21 All the analysis to make such intelligent 
decisions are publicly available and have been researched by the many banks and 
academics. Being smart with respect to Beta is about creating simple rules that can 
capture the available market research, but more important have relevance to the 
Liabilities of this fund. The regular output of such rules is the recommended asset 
allocation weights to Beta assets depending on whether assets are favored or not in the 
                                                 
21 This is quite different from tactical asset allocation (TAA) which is often unconstrained, though the same 
discipline of a good TAA program can be applied to just the beta assets and constraints. current environment. Hence beta management is about Dynamic Asset Allocation (DAA) 
and not static allocation. Dr. Woody Brock would term Beta Management as Dynamic 
Passive Management. 
 
We provide some examples using factors that can help manage allocations between 
Japanese Stocks and Bonds. For example, two profitable rules could be specified as 
follows: favor Domestic Stocks to be overweight by 0.25% over the benchmark weight of 
11% when dividend yields are high or 2-month moving average of the Topix is greater 
than a 6-month moving average of the Topix. On the other hand, underweight Domestic 
Stocks by 0.25% when the opposite is true. Clients can evaluate many such ideas and 
ensure that their consistent application can lead to positive outperformance.
22 Combining 
many such rules across multiple assets can lead to diversification of results and still 
provide a very clear set of recommendations to GPIF/PRFA as to the aggregate 
recommendation. For example, if the dividend yield rule favors stocks, while the 
momentum does not, then it is an indication to GPIF/PRFA staff to be at the benchmark 
weight for Domestic Stocks. 
 
                                                 
22 Such a process was demonstrated in the context of currency in Arikawa and Muralidhar (2006). We created a combination of a number of such rules
23  to ensure that GPIF/PRFA could 
rebalance its assets using cash flows within the range with minimal turnover so as to not 
impact markets. We report in Table 3, the annualized excess returns over the SAA that 
would have been generated by applying such a multi-factor “Intelligent Rebalancing” 
approach. In addition, we provide typical pension risk and performance statistics such as 
relative risks, return-to-risk ratios, worst single month versus SAA from adopting 
“Intelligent Rebalancing”, maximum drawdown, number of positive months (success 
ratio), ratio of Good/Bad risk and Annual Turnover. In this simulation,  
 
Table 3: The Historical Potential Value-Added from an Intelligent Rebalancing 
Approach (07/03/1995 – 10/26/2006; No transaction cost assumed) 
 
 
Source: AlphaEngine® - www.mcubeit.com
 
The most interesting result is that such an approach of “Intelligent Rebalancing” could 
have added 0.35% annually with minimal risks and a very high success ratio of 69% of 
                                                 
23 The factors used in this model ranged from the strength of the yen, slope of yield curves, global equity 
risk, seasonality of markets, momentum of markets, momentum of 10 year yields, and default premiums to 
help GPIF staff allocate intelligently across Domestic Stocks, Domestic Bonds, Foreign Stocks, Foreign 
Bonds and Cash. Each factor is used to manage the allocation between specific asset pairs to create a 
single rule and rules  are combined to produce the Intelligent Rebalancing decisions. Decisions are made 
just once a month thereby requiring infrequent decisions and coincident potentially with when cash flow 
decisions will be made. We have ignored transactions costs, but these could be easily added. Given the low 
annual turnover for the given added value, costs are unlikely to affect the profile dramatically. Past results 
are not a guarantee of future results, and hence this simulation is indicative of one possible result among 
many possibilities. the months adding value relative to the SAA. Chart 5 shows the historical cumulative 
growth of the GPIF/PRFA SAA (Green) against the Intelligently Rebalanced Portfolio 
(Blue) and drawdowns of excess returns (Red and RHS). Clearly, based on this single 
historical simulation, which was not optimized, it can be shown that the performance 
could have been improved (with the usual caveats of historical simulations). 
 
More critically, since GPIF/PRFA staff are always going to make such rebalancing 
decisions, this process of “Intelligent Rebalancing” not only makes decisions transparent, 
formal and state-of-the-art thereby improving the governance of the GPIF/PRFA fund 
and making it less susceptible to external criticism, but has the potential to raise the 
overall return by using market dynamic and cash flow decisions within the SAA range to 
favor assets likely to do well and underweight assets likely to do poorly for net gain to 
the overall fund. This is not a result that is specific to GPIF/PRFA but is something that 
can be applied by any investor in any part of the globe because of the dynamism of assets 
and the implicit bets being made by investment staff as they invest in cash flows.
2425
 
In short, this section was meant to highlight that given the current SAA for GPIF/PRFA, 
dynamism of markets, the ranges around the DAA, and the fact that staff will be making 
cash flow decisions on an ongoing basis, there is a potential to generate additional returns 
from intelligent management of the portfolio on only beta assets.  Given the political 
                                                 
24  See also “Beta Management: An integrated, transparent, rules-based framework (2006)”, Tim Barrett,   
Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer, San Bernardino County Employees’ Retirement 
Association, presentation at Institutional Investor - Hedge Fund Conference, October 23, 2006, Chicago, 
USA. 
 
25 Arikawa, Muralidhar and Muralidhar (2006) use the same techniques as mentioned in Barrett (2006) to 
focus on using intelligent beta management to improve solvency. issues surrounding changes to the SAA, it may be more feasible to attempt to improve the 
returns of the GPIF/PRFA portfolio from applying state-of-the-art investment techniques 
to the operations of the portfolio management. If the portfolio managers feel that such a 
task is beyond their capabilities, then it is possible to outsource such decision making to 
external managers, but for now we have assumed that such a process can be implemented 
by GPIF/PRFA staff (as this has been done by staff of many public funds in the United 
States). 
Chart 5: Cumulative Growth of SAA (green), Intelligently Rebalanced Portfolio 
(Blue) and Drawdown of Excess Returns (Red) 
 
Source: AlphaEngine® - www.mcubeit.com
 Section 6: Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Japan, through its EPI system, has established 
an effective reform by retaining defined benefits when most of the world was drifting 
towards defined contributions (only to recognize the limited value of such a system). In 
addition, the reforms are broad and have helped temper the impact on benefits of 
significant ageing of the population. Moreover, through a judicious policy of creating a 
partially funded system Japan has a unique set of favorable circumstances that can allow 
it to achieve long term pension stability, especially since these monies are being 
transitioned to a market-based global portfolio with appropriate governance and 
oversight 
 
We apply some insights from Modigliani and Muralidhar (2003) to the Japanese system 
and demonstrate that given the unique and far-thinking measures already undertaken by 
the Japanese, that the financing of pensions is robust. However, rather than gradually 
depleting the fund over the next 95 years, if a small improvement can be made to the 
target return of the fund, potentially contributions could be reduced, while also lowering 
the volatility of contributions. Modigliani and Muralidhar (2003) showed that keeping a 
system partially funded was beneficial relative to a pure pay-as-you-go system as it could 
lower the volatility of contributions and make countries more competitive (as 
contributions are a tax on companies and could lead to higher wages).   
In addition, we demonstrated that the basic improvement in return to keep contributions 
stable at the current level while achieving long term pension stability in steady state can be achieved by either modifying the SAA, but if such a move is politically sensitive, then 
the additional 30 bps of returns could be easily achieved through a process of “Intelligent 
Rebalancing.” Such a process is not only good governance, but easily achievable by 
GPIF/PRFA especially since the fund will be impacted by cash inflows from maturing 
deposits and cash outflows to pay pensions, and the range around the SAA permits such 
intelligent management of assets given the cyclicality of financial markets. However, 
inspite of these measures, Japan may benefit from implementing the swap proposed by 
MM between GPIF/PRFA and MHLW to (a) prevent political interference in the 
management of assets and (b) to ensure that volatility in short term returns are borne by 
the government to achieve the higher goal of long term pension stability. 
 
Japan has a unique opportunity to manage the most dramatic ageing of a population 
globally through some innovative, minor modifications to investment policy and 
implementation, especially since they area at a very advantageous situation currently 
relative to countries such as the United States. If such measures are not taken quickly, 
Japan could find itself in a situation where contributions may have to be raised or the 
volatility of contributions will be high. Such an outcome in the future would be a pity 
given that the currently implemented reforms have already put Japan on a much more 




We ignore transition issues initially and begin by reviewing the forces that determine the 
required long term contribution rate in steady state, for the two alternative financing 
approaches: PAYGO and FULL FUNDING.
i   For each financing method, the 
contribution rate depends on a number of parameters, reviewed below.  Some of these are 
“exogenous”, i.e., outside the direct control of policy makers. They include:  
i) The rate of growth of real income (ρ), and its two components (items ii and iii); 
ii)  the growth of the labor force (n); 
iii)  productivity growth (q); 
iv)  longevity (e); and  
v)  the rates of return on various financial assets (r), and their volatility. 
 
The policy determined parameters include: 
i)  the standard retirement age, which together with longevity determines 
the average duration of the pension annuity; 
ii)  the portfolio in which the accumulated capital of the fund is invested 
(important mostly for a funded scheme since under a pure PAYGO 
there is, in principle, no accumulated capital to invest); and 
iii)  the so-called “rate of replacement”, or the ratio of the pension to some 
measure of income earned while working and contributing.  The 
                                                 
26 Adapted from Modigliani and Muralidhar (2003). specification of the replacement rate involves detailing what measure 
of income should be used (e.g., terminal versus lifetime average) and 
how it is related to the years of contribution. 
 
Define at to be assets in a funded system at time t, and wt to be the wage bill at time t. 
Also, defined At to be the asset to wage ratio, ct to be the contribution rate at time t (i.e., 
contributions divided by wages) and pt to be the cost ratio. In a funded system, one can 
observe the following dynamics. 
At  = [at-1(1+r)]/[ wt-1(1+ρ)]+ c(t)-p(t)………………..(A.1) 
As a result, A can be approximated by the following: 
At  = At-1 (1+ r-ρ)+c(t) –p(t),  where ρ = n + q…………..(A.2) 
Which can be rewritten as  
At - At-1 = At-1 (r-ρ)+c(t) –p(t)………..(A.3) 
 
But when the pension system reaches a steady state, assets must grow at the same rate as 
the wage bill, i.e., the growth of A(t) must be zero, implying the following fundamental 
relationship:  
c(t) = p(t) - At-1(r-ρ)………………………….(A.4) 
 
We will call this equation the “Golden SS Rule.” The net return on the system’s reserves 
help pay a portion of the benefits, but provided that the net return is positive or r>ρ, 
which is the necessary condition for funding to be preferred to PAYGO. 
 The effect of the major parameters on the required contribution rate under different 
financing schemes is illustrated in Tables A.1A and A.1B which also serve to support our 
contention that, under realistic assumptions, a funded system is distinctly preferable to 
PAYGO, both because it requires lower long term contributions and because insolvency 
poses less of a problem. The rate of return (r) in the tables is the real (gross) rate of return. 
However, there are situations as shown in Tables A.1A and A.1B where PAYGO 
requires a lower contribution rate than funding, namely when r <ρ. 
 
For our calculations we assume a set of parameters, which we regard as plausible though 
not necessarily coinciding with those relevant for the United States or any other country. 
These include: 40 years of contributions and a replacement rate of 50% of life average 
income (if we changed the assumptions on the replacement rate, all the contribution rates 
reported would change in proportion).  As for average length of life after retirement, we 
show the implications of two alternative assumptions.  In the left portion of the tables, we 
assume life expectancy of 16 years while on the right-hand side, life expectancy is 
assumed to be 18 years.  Japan has similar characteristics with a more likely life 
expectancy scenario being 18 years. It is further assumed that, for the funded scheme of 
Table A.1B, the assets of the fund are invested in the ‘indexed portfolio’ of all marketable 
securities, and swapped for the real interest rate  indicated in the leftmost column.  Tables A.1 A and A: Comparing contribution rates for different scenarios 
(As a percentage of wages - some cells intentionally left blank) 
    
Table 3.1A
Cost and Contribution Rates for Alternative Systems and Selected Scenarios
Assumptions:  Working Life = 40 Years;  Average Salary = 50% Replacement
Cost Ratio = Pay-as-you-go Scheme Contribution Rates for Different Scenarios
Retired Life - 16 Years Retired Life - 18 Years
   Real Productivity Growth    Real Productivity Growth
0% 1.00% 1.40% 2.00% 0% 1.00% 1.40% 2.00%
Population Growth
0% 20.00% 15.40% 13.40% 11.90% 22.50% 17.20% N/A N/A
1% 15.05% 11.70% 10.40% 9.00% 16.77% N/A N/A N/A
2% 11.24% 8.80% 7.00% N/A 12.41% N/A N/A N/A
Table 3.1B
Cost Ratio = Funded Scheme Contribution Rates for Different Scenarios
Retired Life - 16 Years Retired Life - 18 Years
                                                                            Real Productivity Growth
0% 1.00% 1.40% 2% 0% 1.00% 1.40% 2%
Return on Assets
0% 20.00% 20.11% 20.15% 20.23% 22.50% 22.62% 22.67% 22.75%
1% 15.05% 15.33% 15.45% 15.63% 16.77% 17.08% 17.21% 17.41%
2% 11.24% 11.60% 11.75% 11.97% 12.41% 12.81% 12.97% 13.22%
3% 8.33% 8.70% 8.86% 9.10% 9.12% 9.53% 9.70% 9.96%
4% 6.13% 6.48% 6.63% 6.86% 6.66% 7.04% 7.21% 7.46%
5% 4.49% 4.80% 4.93% 5.14% 4.84% 5.17% 5.32% 5.54%
6% 3.26% 3.53% 3.64% 3.82% 3.50% 3.78% 3.90% 4.09%
Approx. replacement 50% 41% 38% 34% 50% 41% 38% 34%
 on final salaryThe PAYGO scheme 
 
Table A.1A shows an estimate of the ratio of current pensions to contemporaneous 
(taxable) wages, or the so-called “cost ratio for pensions” for different parameter values. 
However, under a pure PAYGO financing scheme, since pension outlays must, by and 
large, be equal to current contributions, the cost ratio also measures the ratio of required 
contributions to wages or the “equilibrium contribution rate”. 
 
The main thing to note in Table A.1A is the extreme sensitivity of the contribution rate to 
growth parameters of population (n) and productivity (q), and hence their sum, (ρ).  The 
required contribution rate declines with population growth (n), through the well-known 
“age pyramid” effect.  The lower n, the higher the ratio of retired beneficiaries to the 
active workers that must support them with their contribution, and hence the higher the 
required contribution rate and the quantitative effect is impressive.  The effect of 
productivity growth is more complex, but it works in the same direction and is 
quantitatively very similar.  Thus the required contribution depends essentially on the 
sum: (n + q = ρ).  It is seen from the table that a decline in ρ by two percentage points 
from two to zero requires a rise in contribution of some nine percentage points from 11% 
to 20%!  But for many of the countries in Europe (e.g., Italy), the replacement rate is up 
to 80% of terminal income, which means around 100% of average income, and therefore 
the figures in the table must be doubled (Modigliani and Ceprini 1998).  In particular, 
with a productivity growth closer to 1.5%, and little population growth the table suggests 
an equilibrium contribution of 20-25%, which is close to what SS levies actually are in those countries. In the case of Japan, productivity growth is estimated at approximately 
1.1% (difference between growth of wages of 2.1% and inflation of 1%), but the labor 
force growth is expected to be negative making these figures less attractive for PAYGO. 
 
In short, with PAYGO financing, the required contribution is much too susceptible to 
small and very plausible changes in prospective growth and therefore that approach does 
not provide the basis for a stable pension system – one that is not continuously 
threatened by major crises, such as the current one. 
 
The funded scheme 
 
Table A.1B that reports the contribution rate needed under a funded system.  In a funded 
scheme, in steady state, outlays are financed by the sum of contributions and interest on 
accumulated assets. This is shown in equation (A.4). One of the interesting things that 
equation (A.4) gives us is the opportunity to examine the dynamics of this equation to 
changes in n and q. These dynamics will help us understand the implications for various 
variables for the funded system. We first start with population growth, which we know 
has no implication for the contribution rate. 
 
dp/dn = 0 + (-At-1)+ (r-ρ)dA/dn………………………….(A.5) 
or dA/dn = (1/ (r-ρ))[dp/dn + At-1] ……………………….(A.6) 
 We know that the cost ratio is a declining function of population growth, which means 
that if population growth increases, then there must be an appropriate adjustment in the 
asset-wage ratio. In general, A will be in the neighborhood of 2-3, and dp/dn (from 
Tables A1A and B) is of the order of 4-5, and hence dA/dn is also negative suggesting 
that the asset-wage ratio must decline. The intuition behind this, from work by 
Modigliani and Brumberg (1963), is that wealth is largely an increasing function of age, 
and population growth increases the ratio of young to old. Therefore, with population 
growth, the wealth-income ratio tends to decline. 
 
The more difficult scenario is the impact of productivity growth on the variables. We 
know that dp/dq <0, and dc/dq > 0 from Tables A.1A and B (as real wages increase, 
contribution rates need to increase to be able to sustain the higher annuities required to 
sustain a given replacement rate).  
 
dp/dq = dc/dq +  (-At-1)+ dr/dq (At-1)+ (r-n-q)dA/dq……………………….(A.7) 
dA/dq = (1/(r-n-q))[dp/dq – dc/dq +(1-dr/dq) (At-1)] ……………………….(A.8) 
 
In general, dr/dq could be assumed to be greater than zero. Given the previous analysis 
for population growth, this would suggest that dA/dq would also be <0. 
 
A comparison of Table A.1A with Table A.1B reveals in striking fashion the much 
smaller required contribution for given benefits under the funded system.
ii  The reason 
for the difference is that, in the funded scheme, a large portion of the pensions is paid not from the cash contribution, but by the interest on the accumulated wealth.  Take for 
instance the case most favorable to the funded system in Table A.1B: a zero growth of 
income, 6% rate of return on investment and 18 years retirement.  Here the PAYGO 
contribution is 22.5% versus only 3.5% for the funded system!  Such a difference may 
seem impossibly large. The explanation, of course, is that by the time the funded system 
reaches maturity, the Social Security trust funds (TF) holds assets amounting to about 3.2 
times wages, the return on which at 6% is sufficient to fill the gap. 
 
To be sure, the above illustration is rather extreme, but the difference remains large even 
for more realistic cases.  For instance, let us consider the case most similar to the long 
run growth assumptions for the United States corresponding to the so-called 
“intermediate cost” projections.  The corresponding contribution required under PAYGO 
is shown by the shaded entry in the right side of Table 3.1A, namely 17.2% (which is the 
1999 estimate of the OAS cost ratio for pensions by the third quarter of this century).  
We see from the corresponding column of Table A.1B that the required contribution for 
the funded system is less than 4% for a rate of return of 6%, and for a rate of return of 
5% it is just over 5% or more than 2/3 lower.  Even with a return as low as 4% (roughly 
150 bps higher than the current real rate on U.S. Treasury Inflation-proof bonds) the 
equilibrium contribution is but 7% or 60% lower. 
 
Tables A.1A and A.1B also bring out several other aspects in which a funded system 
dominates PAYGO financing (Feldstein 1997).  We have already argued that, in a funded 
system, the required contribution is independent of (n).  Table A.1B demonstrates that it is also hardly affected by (q), and then in the direction opposite than under PAYGO; 
namely, it declines if (q) declines (because of the resulting increase in the “adjusted” rate 
of return).  Not surprisingly, the contribution is seen to increase with life expectancy, (e) 
but the effect is surprisingly small. With a 5% return, a rise in (e) from 16 to 18 years, 
which is a fairly large one, requires an increase in contribution of only around 35 basis 
points, while under PAYGO the increase is close to 200 basis points. But even that small 
effect can be made to disappear by relying on the often-proposed remedy of somehow 
“indexing” the standard retirement age to life expectancy. Specifically, we suggest that 
the retirement age (i.e., the years of contribution) be tied to life expectancy in such a way 
that the increased contribution offsets the cost of the partially increased expected 
duration of the stream of pension payments. Of course, we would retain the present 
option to retire earlier than the standard, but with a cut in the pension, reflecting the 
smaller contribution and longer benefit periods.  
 
To summarize, the results of this section provide the evidence for the claim set out in the 
summary that on grounds of the current cost-to-benefit ratio, of flexibility and of stability 
of required contributions with respect to likely changes in exogenous parameters, the 
fully funded system  is superior to PAYGO (in steady state). Further, this analysis gives 
us three key conclusions:  
i) The cost ratio and the net returns depend on growth and hence the dominance 
of funding over PAYGO may be overstated if one carelessly disregards the 
role of growth;  ii) In the PAYGO system, a decline in the growth rate has a large impact on the 
required contribution (for given benefits), while with a funded system the 
effect is of a smaller magnitude (and opposite in sign) as a result of the 
accompanying increase in the asset-wage ratio (we will examine the impact of 
growth on nominal rates of return later); and  
iii) If the asset-wage ratio rises, it may lead to a decline in r. This in turn, may 
make the funded system less dominant. Under such scenarios mixing systems 
may make sense. APPENDIX 2 – STEPS TO CREATE MM MODEL FOR JAPAN 
 
 
Step 1: We needed to calculate the wage assumptions underlying 
the entire analysis through 2100. To do so, we took the value 
of the contributions from employer and employee and since we 
know what percent of wages it is, we extracted the wage bill 
in Yen terms from the EPI forecast. 
 
Step 2: The government subsidy in Yen terms was then extracted 
from the EPI Forecast Tables = (TOTAL INCOME - CONTRIBUTION BY 
EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE – RETURNS INVESTMENT). This was then 
converted to a percent of wages. 
 
Step 3: The return on the investment portfolio for every year 
through 2100 was calculated by taking the return amount for 
every year in Yen terms from the EPI forecast and dividing it 
by the previous year’s Trust Fund 
 
Step 4: Based on the wages calculated in Step 1, we also 
calculated the growth rate of nominal wage bill (which 
includes the rate of growth of wages and changes to the labor 
force participation. 
 
Step 5: All parameters are converted to percent of wages. We 
now examine all the sources of funds (contributions from 
employers and employees; government subsidy; returns on 
assets) with the uses of funds (pension payments). The 
difference of these parameters gives the surplus which is 
added to the previous year’s asset-to-wage ratio. This asset-
to-wage ratio multiplied by the nominal return of 3.2% minus 
the growth of the nominal wage bill, gives the return earned 
for the following year. 
 
Step 6: We calculate additional ratios such as Asset/Benefit 
Ratio, though for MM purpose the Asset-to-Wage ratio is most 
interesting and relevant. 
 
Step 7: To calibrate the model for the base case to the MHLW 
projections meant we had to ensure that the ratio of assets to 
benefits was 1.0 in 2100 and the total contribution in 2100 
was 26.22%. Therefore, we had to add an additional return of 
0.04% annualized. This does not affect the calculations but 
was the only way we could calibrate our simplistic model with 
the MHLW model assuming the base case. 
 
Step 8: Once the basic model is set up, we can add or subtract 
contributions or returns from the base case to see how the 
system will perform and how various financial parameters are 
affected. 
                                                                                                                                                  
i  This section is based on hypothetical data to demonstrate the marked differences in contributions between 
the two approaches. 
ii Sections of Table A.1A are intentionally left blank as they do not add to the analysis. 